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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal regulation of the privacy of medical information is now
at a critical stage. Americans are highly concerned about the process-
ing and use of their personal data. Over three-quarters of the public
currently believes that the individual has lost control of how personal
information is circulated and applied by companies., Indeed, a recent
poll reveals that those who know the most about the current
protection of medical information-physicians, heads of medical socie-
ties, health insurers, and hospital CEOs-are also the most concerned
about threats to personal privacy.2
Social concern about the threat to informational privacy has
resulted in strong approval for the creation of detailed protections for
medical information3 Support for increased protection is well
justified; current regulation of health care data is not successful.
Moreover, the flaws in the existing legal structure will be exacerbated
by inevitable increases in the demand for personal medical
information. In particular, many current proposals for health care
reform seek to increase access to personal medical information for a
host of entities as a means to control medical costs, improve the
provision of medical services, and further scientific research. This
increased access will occur through continued computerization of
health care data and through opening access to personal medical
information.
1. See Harris-Equifax, Health Information Privacy Study 2, 33 (1993) ("Health
Information Privacy Survey") (stating that eighty percent of the American population is very or
somewhat concerned about threats to its personal privacy). These concerns about privacy cut
across all demographic subgroups within American society. Id. at 22-33.
2. Alan Westin, Interpretive Essay, in Health Information Privacy Study at 22.
3. Health Information Privacy Study at 97-103.
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This Article argues that health care reform and marketplace
changes in health care services should be accompanied by improve-
ments in the protection of health care information. Part II of this
Article discusses the weaknesses of current regulation of the use of
personal medical data. Perhaps the most striking indication of these
shortcomings is the sale by direct market mailers of lists of
individuals suffering from certain diseases or conditions.4
The insufficiency of current legal regulation is further
demonstrated by employer access to personal medical information of
employees through corporate wellness programs or employer-man-
aged health insurance plans. 5 Although most workers believe that
such health care data are confidential, employers may use the
information in ways detrimental to employees, including opposing
worker's compensation claims, shifting health care costs to employees
with unhealthy lifestyles, and discouraging litigation by employees
who are slated to lose their jobs. 6 These abuses may not be corrected
by proposed health care reform. For example, the Clinton health
program, which aggressively promoted the dissemination of medical
information and encouraged the establishment of wellness programs,
failed to make adequate provisions for redressing existing weaknesses
in the regulation of health care data.7
Part III of'this Article offers another reason for improvements
in this area of law. It introduces a comparative perspective by exam-
ining significant European developments in data protection law. The
term "data protection" refers to the area of law that governs the
collection, storage, and use of personal information.8 Data protection
regulations represent an ongoing balance between the need for
privacy and for the use of personal information. Europe's generally
high standards of data protection not only provide a positive example,
but also a potential threat, to the United States. European law allows
4. See notes 90.92 and accompanying text.
5. See notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
6. See notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
7. See notes 151-53 and accompanying text. To be just to the Clinton health program, I
must add that the original Health Security Act, even if imperfect, did reflect an awareness of
and willingness to address the issue of privacy protection. Moreover, as the debate regarding
health care reform developed during the 103d Congress, the Clinton Administration proved
responsive to demands for additional privacy in health care information and supported the Fair
Health Information Practices Act of 1994, which I discuss at notes 257-60 and accompanying
text.
8. See generally Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy
in Europe and the United States (Cornel U., 1992); David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in
Surveillance Societies (U.N.C., 1989); Paul M. Schwartz, Data Processing and Government
Administration, 43 Hastings L. J. 1321 (1992).
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states to block the transfer of personal information to those with
insufficient data protection9 As a result, weaknesses in the regula-
tion of health care information threaten United States access to
international data flows. These European restrictions are likely to
have a highly negative impact on American corporations that compete
globally for contracts that involve the processing of health
information. 10  Both the weaknesses in the current American
approach and the developments in Europe offer strong grounds for the
creation of federal standards of fair information practices for health
care in the United States.
Part IV considers the nature of the needed federal standards.
The core of fair information practices that should be applied to
medical information are: (1) the creation of a statutory fabric which
defines obligations with respect to the uses of personal information;
(2) the maintenance of transparent processing systems; (3) the
assignment of limited procedural and substantive rights to the
individual; and (4) the establishment of effective governmental
oversight of data use. This Article develops these four jurisprudential
principles and suggests how they should be applied in an American
data protection law to combat existing weaknesses in the regulation of
American medical privacy.
II. THE PROTECTION OF HEALTH CARE DATA
A Data Processing and Medicine
1. Health Policy Considerations
The Clinton Administration has committed itself to national
health care reform. Its initial approach, as expressed in the Health
Security Act of 1993, involved global budgets for health care expendi-
tures, the creation of regional health care alliances, and universal
coverage for all Americans." Regardless of what reform, if any,
9. See notes 194-218 and accompanying text.
10. See note 211 and accompanying text.
11. Health Security Act of 1993, H.R. 3600, S.1757, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 20, 1993) §§
1001-1006, 1131-1136, 1301-1306, in 139 Cong. Rec. E2571 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1993) ("Health
Security Act"). An official explanation of this Bill is offered by The White House Domestic
Policy Council, Health Security: The President's Report to the American People 21-27 (Oct. 1993)
("Health Security Report"). For a discussion of the Administration's plan by a Clinton advisor,
298 [Vol. 48:295
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Congress eventually enacts, important health care reform is already
taking place and will continue in the immediate future. Some change
is taking place through modifications of legal regulations at the state
level;12 other transformations are being shaped by the private sector.
Two policy issues are driving this reform: the scope of
coverage and the increased costs of health care. On one hand, the
sharply rising cost of health care threatens the economic prosperity of
the United States. As one political scientist has stated, "Simply put,
society cannot afford to fulfill the insatiable medical demands of the
population."'' A piecemeal system of allocating social spending for
medical care has failed to set adequate limits on the cost of these
services.14 On a more individual and immediate level, millions of
citizens are now worried about the current system of employment-
based health insurance, fearing that an unexpected loss of
employment or the development of certain diseases or conditions will
leave them uninsured or uninsurable and, thus, unprotected from
ruinous health care costs. 5
see Paul Starr, The Logic of Health Care Reform: Why and How the President's Plan Will Work
(Whittle, rev. ed. 1994). See also Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, 41 N. Y. Rev. of
Books 20, 22 (Jan. 13, 1994) (developing "prudent insurance" principle to decide that Clinton
health reform proposal is fair); Uwe E. Reinhardt, Universal Coverage. It's Now or Never, N. Y.
Times A23, A23 (June 29, 1994) (arguing that employer-based universal coverage, as advocated
in Clinton's plan, will cut health spending and provide secure health protection for Americans).
12. For discussions of the states' efforts to provide health reform through improved access
to both health care and health insurance, see generally Robert D. Ray and Brian Lester Smith,
Selected Legal Issues Affecting a State's Movement Towards Health Care Reform, 42 Drake L.
Rev. 711 (1993); Robin Toner, Health Care Battle in California Turns on State Insurance, N.Y.
Times Al (Sept. 30, 1994); Robert Pear, States Again Try Health Changes as Congress Fails,
N.Y. Times Al (Sept. 16, 1994).
13. Robert H. Blank, Rationing Medicine 75 (Columbia U., 1988). Although society cannot
afford to fulfill all of its population's demands for health care, difficult decisions about the
valuation of lives and health complicate any attempt to discuss cost containment. As a leading
health economist comments: "That life is priceless need not imply that we will spare no expense
to save a life or cure a disease. Yet that myth persists and gives us comfort.... Given our need
for myths, many mechanisms of cost containment must work in the shadows." Victor R. Fuchs,
The Future of Health Policy 49 (Harvard U., 1993).
14. In the words of the Clinton White House:
Between 1980 and 1992, American health care spending rose from 9 percent of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) to 14 percent. Without reform, spending on health care will
reach 19 percent of GDP by the year 2000. If we do nothing, almost one in every five
dollars spent by Americans will go to health care by the end of the decade, robbing
workers of wages, straining state budgets and adding tens of billions of dollars to the
national debt.
Health Security Report at 7 (cited in note 11).
15. In a 1993 New York Times poll, more than 30% of Americans stated that they or a
member of their family had remained in a job that they wanted to give up or had selected one
job rather than another because of health benefits. Erik Eckholm, ed., Solving America's Health-
Care Crisis 9 (Times Books, 1993). See Dworkin, 41 N.Y. Rev. of Books at 25 (cited in note 11)
(stating that "[health care reform has a reasonable chance of success . . . because so many
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The first, unsuccessful attempt at health care reform by the
Clinton Administration stressed the first issue, universal coverage, as
reflected in the name of the administration's voluminous proposed
legislation, the Health Security Act.16 The theme of the next round of
reform efforts will likely be the second issue, the need to cut costs.
17
2. Privacy Policy Considerations
Whatever reforms are adopted, any changes in the health-
delivery system are likely to increase the use and sharing of health
care information. Medical data processing will be increasingly relied
upon to help reduce waste and fraud, and to increase the efficiency of
both the practice of medicine and the payment process.18 This data
processing will raise new threats to the specific privacy interest of
patients in informational autonomy. Understanding this risk
requires this Article first to consider the nature of health care data
processing as it exists and the impact of changes likely under health
care reform. Additionally, this Part will examine the nature of the
interest in informational autonomy.
a. The Increasing Role of Data Processing in Health Care
Information processing already plays a critical role in the pro-
vision, regulation, and financing of medical services by government
and private entities. The past social tradition of deference to the
medical profession and its self-regulation is silently being replaced by
a model of control through data processing. 9 As two physicians have
voters are frightened by their prospects under the current system"). But see Fuchs, The Future
of Health Policy at 216 (cited in note 13) (noting his pessimism about the likelihood of health
care reform).
16. See note 11.
17. See Clinton's Budget Dilemma: Do the Right Thing or the Political Thing?, Bus. Week
47, 47 (Oct. 24, 1994) (reporting that the President's Chief of Staff "has signaled that the next
year's version of health-care reform should be repackaged as a cost-cutting effort rather than an
overhaul of the health-delivery system").
18. See notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
19. The notion of replacing deference to the medical profession with policies that lead to
new allocations of information first emerged in two contexts in tort law. The first concerned the
application of res ipsa loquitur to break conspiracies of silence among medical caregivers. See
Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (1944) (stating "where a plaintiff receives
unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, all those defendants
who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the
injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an
explanation of their conduct"). Here, the law allows an inference of negligence on the part of all
the health care givers present during an operation to put pressure on these medical profession-
als to provide information about what actually happened.
300 [Vol. 48:295
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commented in the pages of the New England Journal of Medicine,
"Medicine is increasingly a spectator sport."20 A widening audience of
outside observers now watch the performance of doctors, nurses, and
patients.
These outside observers, who include both state and private
entities, rely on the collection and application of information, in-
cluding personal data, as a way to control physicians, regulate health
care expenditures, and help physicians control patients. This infor-
mation is no longer exclusively located in the offices of those directly
responsible for patient care, but is shared among a wide variety of
entities. Alan Westin has made a highly useful description of the flow
of personal medical information in the United States today. Westin
sets out three zones where information is used: zone one is direct
patient care (doctors, clinics, nursing homes); zone two consists of
supporting and administrative activities (service payers, third party
administrators, quality of care reviewers); and zone three includes
broader applications of health data, termed "secondary uses"
(credential and evaluation decisions, public health reporting, social
welfare programs, direct marketing).21 More organizations than ever
before are seeking-and obtaining-access to health care information.
Select examples from the public and private sectors illustrate this
trend.
Medicare and Medicaid demonstrate the government's ability
to control the practice of medicine through data processing. Medicare
is the federal program of health care for the elderly;22 Medicaid is the
joint federal-state program that provides medical services for poor
Another area in which tort law limits deference to physicians is the notion of informed
consent, see note 48 and accompanying text.
20. Steffie Woolhandler and David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating Administrative
Efficiency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 N. Eng. J. Med. 1253, 1253 (1991). See Mark A.
Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost
Containment, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 431, 433-36 (1988) (discussing "a revolutionary tranformation
m . . in American medicine": implementation of new managerial controls over physician
behavior); Lisa Bellin, Many Doctors See Themselves Drowning in a Sea of Paperwork, N.Y.
Times Al, Al (Feb. 19, 1990) (noting that the most common reason given by physicians in a
Gallup Poll who would not go to medical school if they were in college today was "government or
insurance regulations that interfere with doing my job' and cause a lack of autonomy"').
21. Alan F. Westin, Interpretive Essay, in Health Information Privacy Survey at 7 (cited in
note 1).
22. Medicare is a federal insurance program with two distinct components. Part A is a
hospital insurance program that is financed through payroll taxes. 42 U.S.C. § 426 (1988 &
Supp. 1990). Part B provides optional supplemental coverage funded by general federal reve-
nues and beneficiary paid premiums. 42 U.S.C. § 1395j et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1993). For an
excellent introduction to this complex law, see Lawrence A. Frolik and Alison Patrucco Barnes,
Elderlaw 307-35 (Michie, 1992).
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people.23 Both programs have engendered bureaucracies that collect
and review personal data to decide whether a given patient is eligible
for medically necessary services. The decision as to which medical
services are necessary, and therefore subject to public funding, rests
with these bureaucracies and not with the physician.
24
The government has also relied on its collection of personal
medical information to decide how much it will pay for these
medically necessary services. This control is carried out in part
through the government's administration of Diagnosis Related
Groups, or DRGs, in Medicare. 25 Once a given service is found to be
medically necessary, a DRG sets a monetary amount for the
prospective reimbursement of treatment. Currently, over four
hundred DRGs match the condition or disease of a patient with the
reimbursement fee that the federal government will provide.26 These
price controls can only be applied, however, when patient data are
subject to outside review. One important kind of such review involves
the examination of patient records to guard against so-called "DRG
creep," which occurs when physicians place patients into more
generous DRG categories than are warranted. 27
23. Medicaid is run by individual states, who receive federal funds that they are required
to match. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988). The steep, ongoing rise in health care costs has led to periodic
funding crises for Medicaid in individual states. Part of the response to these funding problems
has been cuts in services. See, for example, Benton v. Rhodes, 586 F.2d 1, 14 (6th Cir. 1978)
(stating that "when a state decides to terminate optional [Medicaid] benefits on the basis of lack
of appropriated funds, or for any other state reason, this is a matter of state law or policy which
it was permitted to adopt"). These crises have also been met with piecemeal attempts at raising
additional state revenues. A good example of this ad hoc approach is the tax that Arkansas has
placed on soft drinks since 1993 to overcome its difficulties financing Medicaid. Ark. Stat. Ann.
§§ 26-57-901 to 26-57-909 (Supp. 1993). Such a tax is, of course, highly regressive in nature.
24. Sarchett v. Blue Shield of California, 43 Cal. 3d 1, 729 P.2d 267, 272 (1987); Cowan v.
Myers, 187 Cal. App. 3d 968, 232 Cal. Rptr. 299, 303 (1986); Lockshire v. Blue Cross, 70 Ohio
App. 2d 70, 434 N.E. 2d 754, 756 (1980). See Frank P. Grad, The Public Health Law Manual 24
(American Public Health Assoc., 2d ed. 1990) (stating that Medicare and Medicaid "brought the
government into the field of health care and introduced new regulatory controls into the
provision of medical and treatment services").
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
26. George J. Annas, Sylvia A. Law, Rand E. Rosenblatt, and Kenneth R. Wing, American
Health Law 233-60 (Little, Brown, 1990).
27. Charles J. Dougherty, American Health Care: Realities, Rights, and Reforms 149-53
(Oxford U., 1988).
Another example of data processing in the context of Medicare and Medicaid is the Health
Care Financing Administration's recent attempt to develop a Medicare/Medicaid data bank.
The creation of this data bank was authorized by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993; its purpose is:
to save millions by strengthening processes to (1) identify the approximately 7 million
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries who have other health insurance coverage that
should pay medical bills ahead of the Medicare and Medicaid programs and (2) ensure
that this insurance is appropriately applied to reduce Medicare and Medicaid costs.
302
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A final example of governmental control of the practice of
medicine through information processing is the establishment,
through federal law, of the National Practitioner Data Bank.28 This
data bank contains reports of malpractice payments and other ad-
verse information regarding physicians, dentists, and other health
care practitioners.29 Federal regulations not only require that certain
entities file reports with this data bank but also create powerful in-
centives for hospitals to request information from it as part of
granting clinical privileges and appointments to their staff.30 The
existence of this data bank and of the information processing provi-
sions of Medicare and Medicaid show that the government is already
actively scrutinizing the practice of medicine through reference to and
control of personal data.
Private entities have also adopted the model of control through
information processing; like the government, they apply personal
information technology to strengthen administrative control. Among
the private organizations that rely on data processing are insurance
companies and other third-party payors, including companies that
provide medical insurance through self-insurance, and health main-
tenance organizations, which are managed care plans that provide
comprehensive care services to their enrolled population for a fixed
annual payment per enrollee.31 Government and the private sector
Statement of Leslie G. Aronovitz, General Accounting Office, Medicare/Medicaid Data Bank
Unlikely to Increase Collections From Other Insurers, Before the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, United States Senate, May 6, 1994.
The Medicare/Medicaid data bank, which is to be established by February 1995, has been
unpopular with employers, who have objected to the added paperwork burden that it will
impose on them, and with certain government officials, who perceive it leading to scant or no
savings. See id. at 1. See also Statement of Senator Joe Lieberman, Before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, May 6, 1994.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
29. Id. at § 11101; 45 C.F.R. 60.1-60.14 (1994).
30. The critical language is found in the regulations at 45 C.F.R. 60.10-11 (1994). These
sections require hospitals to file requests for information with the National Practitioner Data
Bank at certain stated intervals, create a presumption of knowledge of information in the Data
Bank on the part of any hospital that fails to comply with this requirement, and allow disclosure
of information in the data bank to medical malpractice plaintiffs only when a "hospital failed to
request information from the Data Bank as required." 45 C.F.R. 60.11 (a)(5) (1994).
In a similar development concerning attorneys, the American Bar Association has estab-
lished a data bank of lawyers who have been subject to disciplinary actions. Amy Stevens, A
List of Bad Lawyers to Go On-Line, Wall St. J. B1 (Aug. 26, 1994). At present, this on-line
service is available only to state disciplinary authorities. Id.
31. In the official terminology, the health maintenance organization ("IMO") provides
health care services for a "prepaid capitated rate." Ray and Smith, 42 Drake L. Rev. at 719-20
(cited in note 12). A proposed variation of the HMO that is popular among some policymakers is
the organized delivery system. The organized delivery system is a vertically integrated system
with physician and health care provider ownership. Id. at 720.
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now share many of the same techniques and technology; the state's
implementation of DRGs has encouraged the use of similar kinds of
price controls by insurance companies and other third-party payors.32
These private companies can be even more aggressive than the gov-
ernment in their review of personal information when deciding rea-
sonable and customary fees for physicians' services and procedures. 33
In addition, when collecting data about their employees, some private
companies go beyond any measures taken by the state regarding its
public servants. Many private companies have collected highly sensi-
tive information as part of Employee Assistance Programs, or EAPs.34
These "wellness programs," which cover almost half of all full-time
workers in the United States, seek to improve the health of employees
by encouraging them to obtain counseling for psychological problems,
stress, and other difficulties. In this fashion, the EAPs lead to the
collection of tremendous amounts of highly sensitive information by
employers-with the result often being unexpected intrusions into
privacy.3 5
The processing and use of health care information by the
government and in the private sector already play a critical role in the
provision of medical services. Yet, this role will likely be even greater
in the future. For example, the Clinton Administration's Health
Security Act looked to telecommunications and information
technology to reduce costs and improve the delivery of medical care. 36
A key part of this proposal was the assignment of a health security
card to all Americans. 7 The Draft Report of the President's Health
Security Plan explained that "[m]uch like ATM cards, the health
security card allows access to information about health coverage
through an integrated national network." 8 This national network of
health care information would take the form of a series of linked,
regional computer networks. In this system, personal information
32. See generally Frolik and Barnes, Elderlaw at 408 (cited in note 22); Hall, 137 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 448-57 (cited in note 20).
33. See Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy in Computerized Medical
Information 23-37 (1993) ("Protecting Privacy in Information").
34. For a discussion of these plans and their weaknesses regarding confidentiality, see
Ellen E. Schultz, Open Secrets: Medical Data Gathered by Firms Can Prove Less Than
Confidential, Wall St. J. Al (May 18, 1994); Who's Reading Your Medical Records, Consumer
Reports 628, 632 (Oct. 1994); Joan Hamilton, Can Company Counselors Help You Cope?,
Business Week 140, 141 (Nov. 14, 1994).
35. See, for example, Hamilton, Business Week at 141 (stating that "EAP data sometimes
fall into the wrong hands"). See also notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
36. Health Security Act § 5101 (cited in note 11).
37. Id. at § 5105.




would be tied to the individual by the assignment of "unique
identification numbers for consumers in health plans.' 9
The goal of increasing reliance on data processing technology
in the provision of medical care is not unique to the Clinton
Administration's plan for health care reform. The Institute of
Medicine's Committee on Regional Health Data Networks has re-
cently advocated a similar approach. This group envisions "health
database organizations" playing a critical role in the future delivery of
medical services.40 These entities will "have access to (and possibly
control of) databases" and a primary mission to publicly release data
and the results of analyses done on the databases under their con-
trol.41 To speed the creation of health database organizations and
improve the accuracy of their data, the committee advocates a decen-
tralized effort to create computer-based patient records. 42 Along
similar lines, the American Hospital Association has called for the
establishment of an electronic "health information infrastructure" to
which all participants in the healthcare system would be linked.43
Information technology may offer the last best hope to control
health care costs. It renders accessible to external observation and
supervision the enormous amount of data involved in diagnosing,
treating, and billing patients. The potential cost savings from greater
use of data processing in health care are enormous. In 1993, the
Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, a voluntary task force
comprised of members from the public and private sectors, estimated
that switching to a system of electronic data exchange would result in
cumulative savings in health care services of forty-two billion dollars
by the end of this century.44
Information technology is also capable of improving the quality
of medical care. As Paul Starr, a sociologist who has advised the
Clinton Administration on health care, writes, 'The application of
information technology to health care holds enormous promise not
just to cut the cost of administrative transactions and eliminate du-
plicate testing, but to reduce errors in treatment and enable profes-
39. Id. at 133; Health Security Act § 5104 (cited in note 11).
40. Molla S. Donaldson and Kathleen N. Lohr, eds., Health Data in the Information Age
40-90 (National Academy Press, 1994) ('Institute of Medicine Study").
41. Id. at 54.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Testimony of the American Hospital Association before the Information, Justice,
Transportation, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations of
the United States House of Representatives 2 (May 4, 1994) (copy on file with the Author).
44. Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, 1993 Report iii (Oct. 1993).
1995] 305
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:295
sionals and patients alike to make better decisions."45 The Clinton
Administration's health care proposal encouraged the application of
information technology to develop treatment protocols and other
medical guidelines. 46 Yet, this focus on the practice and regulation of
medicine through the processing of personal health care information
has a number of potential shortcomings. One of the most important
of these drawbacks is the threat to patient privacy.47
b. Privacy Concerns
Privacy is, of course, a concept that encompasses a wide vari-
ety of interests in American law. The critical privacy interest at stake
here is "informational autonomy." The law has long recognized and
safeguarded another aspect of self-determination in health
care-informed consent in medical decision making. The traditional
doctrine of informed consent protects a patient's interest in personal
autonomy by requiring doctors and patients to discuss relevant
concerns and exchange necessary information before agreeing upon a
course of medical treatment.4
Like informed consent, informational autonomy relates to the
patient's interest in decision making. Autonomous behavior depends
on an individual's ability to engage in critical reflection, which forms
an essential basis for choices about participation in social and politi-
45. Starr, The Logic of Health Care Reform at 93 (cited in note 11). Starr adds, "The
greater use of electronic information systems will also help reduce the 'cost of quality' by per-
mitting less burdensome tracking of treatments and outcomes." Id. at 93-94. See Milt
Freudenheim, Health Industry is Changing Itself Ahead of Reform, N.Y. Times Al, D4 (June 27,
1994) (stating that "[f]or the patient, care could improve as the growing medical networks invest
in sophisticated computerized systems that analyze the care received by their many thousands
of patients and find ways to improve it").
46. The Health Security Act first required the National Quality Management Council to
develop "clinically relevant guidelines" for use by health care providers. Health Security Act §
5006 (a)(1) (cited in note 11). These guidelines were to be presented in different "forms" and
"formats." Id. at § 5006 (a)(2)(B)&(C).
In its tort reform section, the act then required the Secretary of Health and Human Services
to establish a pilot program "to determine the effect of applying practice guidelines in the
resolution of medical malpractice liability actions." Id. at § 5312.
47. Another shortcoming is that application of data processing in medicine may discourage
communication with the patient and encourage cookbook medicine, see Paul M. Ellwood,
Shattuck Lecture-Outcomes Management, 318 New Eng. J. Med. 1549, 1553 (1988).
48. See, for example, Moore v. Regents of University of California, 51 Cal. 3d 120, 793 P.2d
479, 483 (1990); Pratt by Pratt v. University of Minnesota Affiliated Hospitals & Clinics, 414
N.W.2d 399, 402 (Minn. 1987); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). The doctrine
is, however, far from uncontroversial or even settled, see notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
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cal life.49 Yet, the computer creates a strong pressure for individuals
to conform to digital reality.5o Indeed, even without the use of com-
puters, the collection of information can weaken an individual's capac-
ity for critical reflection and limit the terms upon which she joins in
communal life. As history has shown, the collection of information
can have a negative effect on the human ability to make free choices
about personal and political self-governance.
Totalitarian regimes have already demonstrated how individu-
als can be rendered helpless by uncertainty about official use of per-
sonal information. 51 Risks to individual autonomy even arise in a
democratic country, such as the United States, when the law does not
put in place adequate legal protections for personal information. 52
Government must protect the capacity of individuals to engage in
deliberation about important issues in the conduct of their lives.53
This notion of "deliberative autonomy" requires legal attention to
societal data use and applications. Due to the potential coercive effect
of information processing, data protection is a critical precondition to
an individual's ability to act as an independent moral agent.
Data protection is of particular importance in the context of
personal medical information. Misuse of this information can have an
especially negative impact on personal self-government. Consider two
examples: Daniel Ellsberg and Michael Eisner. When the Nixon
Administration sought to harm Ellsberg, who had leaked the
Pentagon Papers to newspapers throughout the United States, the
49. For a classic discussion of the connection between human autonomy, critical reflection,
and the survival of a democratic order see John Stuart Mill, On Liberty ch. 3 (Penguin, 1978)
(original ed. 1859). For a thoughtful discussion of the importance of these values within the
American democratic tradition, see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive
Constitution, 72 Texas L. Rev. 211, 253-55 (1993). See also Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 793-94 (1989) (discussing the way state proscription of certain behavior
can take over or occupy the totality of a citizen's life).
50. For a discussion of this point, see Schwartz, 43 Hastings L. J. at 1334-43, 1349-52
(cited in note 8).
51. The opening of archives in the former German Democratic Republic has made avail-
able a particularly rich body of material on the information gathering of a totalitarian regime.
The East German secret police, the Staatssicherheitsdienst, or Stasi, created a dense network of
full and part-time spies. The Stasi's goal was the constant observation of the population of East
Germany and the resulting promotion of a sense of danger in all human relations. See gener-
ally Joachim Gauck, Die Stasi Akten (Rowholt, 1991); David Gill and Ulrich Schr6tter, Das
Ministerium far Staatssicherheit 90-97 (Rowohlt Berlin, 1991).
52. Perhaps the clearest example of this risk arose during the McCarthy era. During this
time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation set up a large informer network and fed the resulting
information about suspected radicals, generally without legal controls, to loyalty boards, em-
ployers, and neighbors. See David Caute, The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge Under
Truman and Eisenhower 111-38 (Simon & Schuster, 1978).
53. John Rawls, Political Liberalism 214-35 (Columbia U., 1993); Fleming, 72 Texas L.
Rev. at 253-55 (cited in note 49).
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cornerstone of its strategy was to gain access to certain of his medical
records.54 This strategy led to a break-in at the office of Ellsberg's
psychiatrist, which, characteristically, the responsible henchmen
bungled.55 The goal of Nixon's operatives was to destroy Ellsberg's
public image and credibility and to discourage his continuing in-
volvement in political affairs.56 The Ellsberg case demonstrates that
the realms of political self-governance and personal self-governance
are complementary: 57 Unauthorized access to Ellsberg's records
would have affected both his involvement in the democratic order and
his personal autonomy.
The second example concerns Michael Eisner, chairman and
chief executive officer of the Walt Disney Company. He is one of the
most important and powerful corporate officers in the United States.
In addition to his generous salary and stock benefits, Eisner receives
extra health benefits as a top Disney executive.58 Yet, when Eisner
was recently stricken with pains in his arms while at a conference of
top corporate leaders, he had serious doubts about whether he should
submit the resulting bill for medical services to his company's insur-
ance program. 59 According to one report, "Eisner's concern was keep-
ing his health from becoming a topic of conversation at Disney."60
When Eisner returned to Los Angeles, he went directly to a hospital
and underwent emergency quadruple-bypass surgery-but not before
taking the precaution of registering at the medical center under an
assumed name.61
Eisner's concern over his medical records does not have much
to do with political self-governance. It has everything to do with his
worries about his control over the Disney Company at a time of tur-
moil in the top executive ranks.62 This case illustrates the adage that
54. United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 78-79 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Fred Emery, Watergate:
The Corruption of American Politics and the Fall of Richard Nixon 58-70 (Times Books, 1994).
55. Liddy, 542 F.2d at 78-79; Emery, Watergate at 67-69.
56. In his memoirs, Richard Nixon candidly admits his "sense of urgency about discredit-
ing what Ellsberg had done and finding out what he might do next." Richard Nixon, Memoirs
534 (Grosset & Dunlap, 1984). As far as whether he gave his direct approval for the break-in at
Ellsberg's psychiatrist, Nixon first states that he does not believe that he knew of this action
before it took place and then adds, in a classic Nixonian construction, "[given the temper of
those times and the peril I perceived, I cannot say that had I been informed of it beforehand, I
would have automatically considered it unprecedented, unwarranted or unthinkable." Id.
57. Fleming, 72 Texas L. Rev. at 254 n. 211 (cited in note 49).
58. George Anders, Employee Health Benefits May be Fine, But Look at What Some
Executives Get, Wall St. J. B1, Bl (Oct. 25, 1994).
59. Kim Masters, A Mouse Divided, Vanity Fair 166 (Oct. 1994).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 166-72.
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knowledge is power: From the lowliest worker anywhere to the
mightiest executive at the Magic Kingdom, access to medical informa-
tion can affect social and economic status and how one leads her life.
This example also suggests that one popular aspect of health care
reform-its emphasis on preventative medicine-requires safeguards
on access to medical data. Preventative medicine requires that people
see their health care provider early and often.63 Yet, without ade-
quate limitations on the dissemination of medical data, individuals
will think twice about visits to physicians for anything less than
emergencies."
Rather than creating an absolute individual power over per-
sonal information, the law should evaluate competing values and
strike a balance between individual and societal interests. An
individual's control over medical and other personal information
cannot be complete because, at least to some extent, these data reflect
an outside social reality. Thus, the protection of informational
autonomy requires the law to create "fair information practices" that
are consistent with and promote an individual's capacity for decision
making while also safeguarding society's interest in increasing the
efficiency and quality of health service. The creation of fair
information practices will be discussed at greater length in this
Article's Part IV.
Although the law in this country occasionally recognizes the
importance of informational self-determination, it fails to protect this
value in the context of health care. It does not put in place the neces-
sary fair information practices. The regulation of the processing of
medical data falls far short of creating an effective law of data protec-
tion, as is shown by examples provided in the next Part.
63. The Clinton Administration's health care proposal stressed the importance of preven-
tative medicine, see Health Security Act § 3331-3334 (cited in note 11) (calling for national
initiatives regarding health promotion and disease prevention). See also Eckholm, ed., Solving
America's Health-Care Crisis at 195 (cited in note 15) (discussing importance of preventative
medicine).
64. Indeed, Consumer Union, an influential non-profit organization, is already warning
individuals to be careful about the information that they share with their health care provider
because of privacy concerns. This organization's advice: "While you should certainly tell your
physician everything necessary for proper medical treatment, think twice before disclosing
information that has no bearing on your health." Who's Reading Your Medical Records?,
Consumer Reports at 629 (cited in note 34).
This advice ignores the difficulty of knowing which personal information may be relevant to
diagnosis or treatment. Compare United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 638 F.2d
570, 574-80 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that significant public interest in research designed to im-
prove occupational safety and health permits National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health investigators to view workers' entire medical files because a "heretofore unsuspected"
factor may be revealed by such searching examination).
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B. Current Data Protection Measures
At present, protection of medical information in this country is
less than satisfactory.65 The regulatory scheme consists of federal law
that applies only to data in the control of the government and to cer-
tain specific kinds of health information. The scheme also includes
various state measures that, taken together, create at best a
patchwork of insufficient protection. Moreover, the laws of the
various states are far from uniform. In an age of prevalent interstate
data transfers, this lack of uniformity is itself an additional weakness
in medical data protection in the United States.
The weakness of the regulation of health care information has
been commented upon by many observers. The federal Privacy
Protection Study Commission in 1977 noted that the billions of visits
that Americans make to physicians in a single year and the long pe-
riod of retention for medical records result in an enormous number of
such records in the United States.66 Yet, this blue-ribbon panel
concluded, "even more staggering is the realization of how many
people besides the medical-care providers who create a medical record
have access to it .... "67 The commission identified numerous flaws in
the protection of health care data privacy in the United States.
Improvements in this area of law were viewed as a matter of some
urgency as "there appears to be no natural limit to the potential uses
of medical-record information for purposes quite different from those
for which it was originally collected."68
The legal scheme has not notably improved since the Privacy
Protection Study Commission completed its work almost two decades
ago. A recent report by Congress' Office of Technology Assessment
concludes, 'The present legal scheme does not provide consistent,
comprehensive protection for privacy in health care information,
whether it exists in a paper or computerized environment.69
According to the Committee on Regional Health Data Networks of the
Institute of Medicine, the "threats and potential harm" from disclo-
sure of health records "are real and not numerically trivial. ' 7o Finally,
65. More satisfactory protection is provided for individuals who receive care from federally
financed drug and alcohol treatment centers. See notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
66. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society 277
(GAO, 1977).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 290-91.
69. Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy in Information at 13 (cited in note
33).
70. Institute of Medicine Study at 156 (cited in note 40).
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Sheri Alpert, a government policy analyst, notes that "video rental
records are afforded more federal protection than are medical re-
cords."71
The law must contend today with an enormous-and ever
growing-demand for personal medical information. This great inter-
est in medical information has not been met by legal regulation that
achieves an adequate balance among competing interests. The exist-
ing patchwork of laws fails in a number of ways. One shortcoming is
the abuse of the notion of "informed consent" to information
disclosure.
As has been noted above, informed consent is required to pro-
tect not only physical self-determination but also informational self-
determination. Consent to the use of one's medical data can only be
informed if it follows a genuine disclosure of the intended uses of the
personal information. Yet, in the United States, the current norm is
"uninformed consent" to disclosure of personal medical data. Service
payors, such as insurance companies, and service providers, such as
doctors and clinics, generally have their customers, the consumers of
health care services, sign '%lanket" disclosure releases. 72 These broad
disclosure documents have been used to justify almost any secondary
use of medical data. Blanket releases have permitted the disclosure
of medical information to such bodies as pharmaceutical companies,
employers, workers, direct market mailers, and the Medical
Information Bureau, a nonprofit association that supplies insurance
companies with medical information in order to prevent fraud.73
Other kinds of information sharing now take place as a result
of vertical integration in the health care sector. Here, no disclosure
releases are sought from patients; rather, a company that seeks per-
sonal medical information simply buys or merges with the company
that has first collected the data. This trend began last year with the
merger between Merck & Co., the world's largest pharmaceutical
company, and Medco Containment Services, this nation's largest mail
71. Sheri Alpert, Smart Cards, Smarter Policy: Medical Records, Privacy and Health Care
Reform, 23 Hastings Center Report 13 (Nov.-Dec. 1993). See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the
Information Economy, 44 Fed. Comm. L. J. 195, 227-34 (1992) (discussing statutory protection of
personal information).
72. Alpert, 23 Hastings Center Report at 13-14.
73. Id. at 15-16; Larry Tye, List Makers Draw a Bead on Many, Boston Globe 12 (Sept. 6,
1993); Ray Schultz, Carlson, Metromail Offer Medical Data, Direct Marketing News 2 (June 21,
1993); Jerrold Ballinger, Kmart to Enter Interactive Field with Pharmaceutical Service Line,
Direct Marketing News 1 (Oct. 25, 1993); Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy in
Information at 32-35 (cited in note 33).
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order pharmacy.7 4 Merck, which sought this merger to gain access to
Medco's detailed collection of personal medical data, is already mak-
ing diligent use of this information in marketing its products.7
Merck's term for this resulting integration of "payors, patients, doc-
tors, pharmacists, other health care providers, and pharmaceutical
companies" is "Coordinated Pharmaceutical Care.' 1 To carry out
similar operations, other drug companies have purchased or are seek-
ing alliances with large pharmacies77 According to the Wall Street
Journal, such drug companies use personal medical information col-
lected by pharmacies "to intervene in relationships among physicians,
patients and pharmacists to influence drug selection and use.''78
Another kind of information sharing takes place within com-
panies that use data generated within Employee Assistance Programs
("EAPs") and employer-managed plans of health insurance. EAPs are
employer-sponsored "wellness programs. 79 Workers are encouraged
to participate in them for such reasons as reducing stress or obtaining
help for family difficulties. Yet, the resulting collections of personal
data are increasingly utilized for other purposes, including fighting
workers' compensation claims, shifting health care costs to employees
with unhealthy lifestyles, and avoiding "litigation from employees
soon to be fired or laid off."8° These uses of personal data currently
take place without notice to or consent from employees. Indeed,
workers are usually told that their contacts with counselors and
psychotherapists will be confidential. 81  Applicable standards of
professional ethics, though possibly violated, have not played an im-
74. Joseph Weber, Is this Rx Too Costly for Merck?, Business Week 28 (Aug. 9, 1993);
Merck & Co., Interim Report For the Period Ended June 30, 1993 2-4 (1993) (copy on file with
the Author).
75. Elyse Tanouye, Changing Minds: Owning Medco, Merck Takes Drug Marketing the
Next Logical Step, Wall St. J. Al (May 31, 1994).
76. Id.
77. A front page story in the Wall Street Journal reported: "SmithKline Beecham PLC
recently announced that it will buy United HealthCare Corp.'s Diversified Pharmaceutical
Services for $2.3 billion. Pfizer Inc. plans to form close relationships with Value Health Inc. and
Caremark International Inc. through strategic alliances." Tanouye, Wall St. J. at Al (cited in
note 75). In addition, Glaxo Holdings, the world's second-largest drug maker, has held talks
about an alliance with McKesson Corp.'s PCS Health Systems Inc., which is the largest drug-
benefits manager in the United States. Stephen D. Moore, Glaxo Chairman to Step Down in
November, Wall St. J. A4 (June 16, 1994).
78. Tanouye, Wall St. J. at Al.
79. Schultz, Wall St. J. at Al (cited in note 34).
80. Id. at A6. See Joan O'C. Hamilton and Michele Galen, A Furor Over Mental Health,
Business Week 66, 68 (Aug. 8, 1994) (stating that EAPs "can be exploited by companies").
81. Schultz, Wall St. J. at Al (cited in note 34).
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portant role in shaping the behavior of health care providers in this
context.82
Significant information sharing also occurs within many en-
terprises that are self-insured.83 Some companies have even opened
their own health clinics for their employees, retirees, and their fami-
lies.84 In fact, John Deere & Company, the world's leading manufac-
turer of farm equipment, recently announced a plan to expand its
chain of clinics for its workers in order to supply health care services
to other companies' employees. 85 As is the case with wellness pro-
grams, personal data have been used in these company-owned health
facilities for purposes beyond the actual provision of medical care.
For example, worker health care information is used to determine the
individual worker's health insurance cost, the extent of covered serv-
ices, and the worker's continuing employment prospects.86
This use of health data could be detrimental not only to the
individual worker, but also to the overall efficiency of the labor mar-
ket in the United States.87 The distinguished health economist Victor
R. Fuchs has noted that employment-based health insurance can
harm labor market efficiency. Health insurance in the United States
is generally tied to employment; the cost of this insurance represents
an ever greater percentage of total compensation; and insurance
premiums are now increasingly based on firm-specific-considerations
rather than community ratings.88 These three aspects of the current
provision of health insurance have caused more and more decisions
about employment and promotion to be based on health-care costs.
An employer's decisions about whom to hire, train, and promote, and
an employee's choices regarding employment will often depend on the
cost and availability of health insurance. Compared to a system of
equitable sharing of medical costs throughout the population, this
approach introduces significant distortions into the efficiency of the
labor market.8 9
82. These codes have been criticized as failing to offer meaningful guidance to health care
professions and as being widely ignored by them. See Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy:
The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 255,
274-78 (1984).
83. Ellen E. Schultz, Advantages of Employer Health Plans Are Disappearing, Wall St. J.
C1 (June 17, 1994).
84. Barnaby J. Feder, Deere Sees a Future in Health Care, N.Y. Times DI (July 1, 1994).
85. Id.
86. Fuchs, The Future of Health Policy at 12 (cited in note 13).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 12-13.
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Thus, the commercial value of personal medical information
has led numerous bodies to seek health care information and to use
these data for purposes that were not disclosed at the time they were
collected. The value of personal medical information has also led to
the compilation and sale of lists of persons with specific conditions or
diseases. These lists, which detail an individual's most sensitive
medical information, are freely trafficked in the United States. For
example, Johnson & Johnson has marketed a list of five million eld-
erly incontinent American women.90 Other companies have adver-
tised lists containing the names of six million allergy sufferers,
700,000 people with bleeding gums, and 67,000 people with epilepsy.91
Other names appear on a mailing list as suitable consumers of prod-
ucts intended for impotent middle-aged men.92
How did we get into the situation in which medical information
is so poorly regulated that such lists are offered for sale?
Understanding the current regulation's inadequacy requires consid-
eration of how the existing patchwork of laws fails to control the
application and use of personal medical data. The regulatory failure
occurs in both federal and state law.
1. Federal Measures
At the federal level, data protection measures are found in
constitutional law, the Privacy Act, and a few statutes that regulate
narrow areas of data use. Any discussion of these provisions must
begin by noting their extremely limited coverage. First, the rights
contained in the United States Constitution generally protect the
individual only from action by the government and not by individuals
or groups within the private sector.93 This limitation is expressed in
the "state action" doctrine, which requires either action by the
government itself or a close nexus between the government and the
90. Tye, Boston Globe at 12 (cited in note 73). Johnson & Johnson has recently taken this
list off the market "in response to privacy concerns." See Who's Reading Your Medical Records,
Consumer Reports at 629 (cited in note 34).
91. Tye, Boston Globe at 12.
92. Just Lists Offers "Male Potency" File, Direct Marketing News 37 (April 19, 1993).
93. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2354 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991); DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. Of Social Services, 489 U.S.
189, 195-97 (1989). See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1688-1720
(Foundation, 2d ed. 1988).




private entity that has infringed a right.94 Yet, the overwhelming
majority of medical information in the United States is not in the
hands of the government, but instead is possessed by private doctors,
hospitals, and insurance companies. These parties are unlikely to
meet the applicable tests for state action, and thus can use
information without constitutional restraints.
A second measure of possible value is the Privacy Act, which
sets rules only for that data controlled by federal agencies.95 As a
result of this limitation, however, it applies to very little of the total
health care information collected. In the 1980s, one expert estimated
that this statute applied merely to five percent of the medical data
banks in the United States.96 The other federal statutes that regulate
medical data processing focus on even narrower sectors of information
use. As a result, most medical data is entirely outside the protections
of either constitutional or federal statutory measures. In addition,
there are notable weaknesses in each of these federal measures even
within their fields of limited application.
When the government collects personal data, a constitutional
right to informational privacy applies. Indeed, this right was first
identified in a case, Whalen v. Roe,97 that involved medical data.
Whalen concerned New York State's plan to collect and store
information relating to the prescription of certain drugs that had both
legitimate and illegitimate applications.98 These drugs were classified
into different schedules, and New York required that prescriptions for
certain substances be prepared by a physician in triplicate on an
official form. One copy of this form was to be forwarded to the New
York State Department of Health in Albany.99
In judging the constitutionality of this state scheme, the
Supreme Court found that the United States Constitution included a
94. The "state action" doctrine is discussed in McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-55; DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 195-98. For scholarly criticism of this doctrine, see, for example, Steven J. Heyman,
The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke L.
J. 507, 509 (1992); David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs,
1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 53, 59.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). The Privacy Act applies only to agencies as defined at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(f) (1988). This statute defines agencies as "executive branch" agencies, the "independent"
regulatory agencies, and government and government-controlled corporations. Id. The Privacy
Act does not, however, extend to records of Congress. It also does not apply to federal courts or
state and local governments.
96. Terra Ziporyn, Hippocrates Meets the Data Banks, 252 JAM.A. 317, 318 (July 20,
1984) (quoting Professor Vincent M. Brannigan).
97. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
98. Id. at 591.
99. Id. At 592-93.
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right of informational privacy that prohibited "disclosure of personal
matters" and protected "independence" in decision making 00 The
nondisclosure interest was supported by reference to cases grounded
in the First and Fourth amendments.' 0' The second interest, that of
independence in decision making, rested on the protection of certain
intimate activities under substantive due process. 0 2
The Supreme Court decided that New York's plan for data
collection did not impinge upon these two interests. The first
interest-avoiding disclosure of personal matters-protects against
public disclosure of information surrendered to the government. 10 3 To
check whether the nondisclosure interest had been violated, the Court
examined the data security measures of New York. These measures
included storing the prescription forms in a vault until their ultimate
destruction; surrounding the room in which these data were received
with a wire fence and protecting this area with an alarm system; and
promulgating statutory and regulatory measures that prohibited
disclosure to the public. 0 4 The Court found such actions were well
designed to insure that the personal medical data collected by the
state government would be kept from the public.0 5
The second Whalen interest-independence in making certain
types of important decisions-was implicated by the patient's decision
whether to acquire and use needed medicine.106 The Court found that
New York's data processing scheme did not violate this interest.
Although the government's record-keeping had discouraged some use
of the drugs in question, "the decision to prescribe, or to use"
remained in the control of the physician and the patient.107 While
open to criticism for certain doctrinal weaknesses,108 the Whalen two-
branch approach offers a model with considerable potential for the
100. Id. at 598-600. The Court was less than precise about the exact constitutional basis of
this right. In a footnote, it cites prior opinions, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) and Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), for the proposition that the basis of this right is the
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty. 429 U.S. at 598-99 n. 23. Yet, the Court
also cites elsewhere to other constitutional provisions, see notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
101. 429 U.S. at 599 n.25.
102. Id. at 600 n. 26. For an analysis of the difficulties and the promise of this approach,
see Paul M. Schwartz, The Computer in German and American Constitutional Law: Towards
an American Right of Informational Self-Determination, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. 675, 677-86 (1989).
103. 429 U.S. at 599-602.
104. Id. at 593-94.
105. Id. at 601-04.
106. Id. at 603.
107. Id.
108. Schwartz, 37 Am. J. Comp. L. at 677-85 (cited in note 102). These weaknesses relate
to two other kinds of privacy law: sexual privacy and Fourth Amendment privacy. Id.
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protection of informational self-determination. Lower courts have
not, however, successfully developed this potential.
Lower courts analyzing governmental attempts to obtain or
examine medical information have done so primarily with reference to
the first Whalen interest, that of nondisclosure. 1 9 Unfortunately,
these courts have analyzed this interest in an inconsistent fashion.
Some lower courts have found that this interest in nondisclosure
applies only to a narrow group of fundamental constitutional rights."0
Indeed, some courts have even viewed Whalen as a decision that sanc-
tions all "legitimate" governmental requests for medical data.", And,
the autonomy interest identified in Whalen has been almost entirely
absent from case law." 2 Thus, although Whalen offers a potentially
useful element in the overall structure of an American data protection
law, it has not led to vigorous protection of medical privacy.
Federal statutory measures have not adequately supplemented
the limited constitutional protection for medical privacy. As stated
before, the Privacy Act applies only to medical records in the control
of federal agencies," 3 and even this limited coverage is not without
109. See, for example, American Civil Liberties Union v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1069-
70 (5th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780, 795 (9th Cir. 1991); Mann v.
University of Cincinnati, 824 F. Supp. 1190, 1198-99 (S.D. Ohio 1993); Doe v. Borough of
Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 382 (D. N.J. 1990); Soucie v. County of Monroe, 736 F. Supp. 33,
35-37 (W.D. N.Y. 1990).
110. See, for example, Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192-94 (4th Cir. 1990)
(applying a nondisclosure interest to a right to privacy); Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, Texas,
765 F.2d 490,492 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
111. See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1539 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that 'legitimate
requests for medical information do not constitute an invasion of the right to privacy").
112. Compare Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1128-32 (5th Cir. 1978) with Mann v.
University of Cincinnati, 824 F. Supp. 1190, 1198-99 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
113. The Privacy Act does not apply to private organizations or to not-for-profit corpora-
tions that do business with the United States government. Even corporations fimded and
regulated by the federal government are not automatically within the reaches of the Privacy
Act. "'[Elxtensive, detailed and virtually day-to-day supervision' by the federal government is
needed before 'agency' status [attaches]." St. Michael's Convalescent Hospital v. California, 643
F.2d 1369, 1374-79 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 180 (1980)). See
also Unt v. Aerospace Corporation, 765 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply the
Privacy Act to a nonprofit corporation formed to provide engineering expertise to the Air Force).
Since the Privacy Act applies to the records of federal agencies alone, it does not control
records that these agencies seek to obtain from private organizations. This distinction between
disclosure from an agency and from a private organization can have importance in the context of
health care information. A recent decision of the Fifth Circuit regarding medical records,
Gilbreath v. Guadalupe Hospital Foundation, Inc., 5 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 1993), is illustrative of
this point.
In Gilbreath, the plaintiff sued to prevent the release of certain hospital records that con-
tained information about the treatment that she and her son received for gunshot wounds at
two hospitals. Local newspapers had reported that the plaintiffs husband had shot her and
their son; these reports had led to the husband's removal from a job at a federal agency. Id. at
787-88. When the plaintiffs husband contested this dismissal, the Merit Systems Protection
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flaws. The most notable shortcoming is in the Privacy Act's insuffi-
cient control of secondary use. Although the Privacy Act generally
permits the disclosure of records only "pursuant to a written request
by, or with the prior written consent of the individual to whom the
record pertains,""' no fewer than twelve exceptions exist to this re-
quirement.115 Of these, the most problematic is the "routine use" ex-
ception, which has been made into an enormous loophole.116 Agencies
have justified a wide variety of data disclosures as the "routine use" of
personal information. For example, the Veterans Administration has
created no fewer than thirty-eight "routine" uses, some exceedingly
broad, for its patients' medical records." 7
Provisions of federal law other than the Privacy Act provide
some protection for medical records. One such measure provides data
protection for the social security records of the Department of Health
and Human Services."18 However, this statute does allow for disclo-
sures both "as otherwise provided by Federal law" and pursuant to
regulations issued by the Secretary.19 In addition, Federal laws
which restrict the use of data after it has been obtained have proven
Board, an independent, quasi-judicial federal agency that adjudicates appeals by federal em-
ployees from adverse personnel actions, sought production of these hospital records. Id. The
Gilbreath court found that the Privacy Act did not prevent disclosure of these records because
the two hospitals whose records were sought were not "agencies" within the meaning of this
statute. Id. at 791. It did not matter that the records were sought by a federal agency; the
Privacy Act only applies to disclosure from agencies, not from private organizations to agencies.
Id.
114. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988).
115. Id. at (b)(1)-(12).
116. Id. at (b)(3). For criticisms of the "routine use" loophole, see Flaherty, Protecting
Privacy at 323-24 (cited in note 8); Bennett, Regulating Privacy at 108-10 (cited in note 8); Todd
Robert Cole, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right of Privacy? An Examination of the
Routine Use Exemption, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 978, 991 (1991).
117. Privacy Act Issuances, 1991 Comp., Volume 2, 938-41. For example, one "routine" use
permits disclosure of records to "Federal, State and local government agencies and national
health organizations in order to assist in the development of programs that will be beneficial to
claimants and to protect their rights under law and assure that they are receiving all benefits to
which they are entitled." Id. at 939. This standard allows the release of personally identifiable
information in instances in which aggregate data would suffice.
Another exception allows release to "a member of the general public" who makes "an inquiry
about a named individual" regarding "the amount of monthly VA monetary benefits being
received by the patient." Id.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1988). Social security records often contain a variety of medical
information. This information is most typically collected in connection with claims for disability
benefits. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managing Social Security
Disability Claims (Yale U., 1983). A federal statute prevents "any officer or employee of the
Department of Health and Human Services in the course of discharging' the social security
program from disclosing any "file, record, report or any other paper, or information, obtained at
any time by any person" from the Department. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988). The regulations are found at 20 C.F.R. §401.100 et seq.
(1994).
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ineffective. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")
generally forbids employers from considering an employee's health in
making employment decisions. 120 Unfortunately, this protection has
proven less than efficacious because job applicants are often either
unaware or unable to prove that employers considered their health
information.121 Even less helpful is the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"),122 which prohibits hiring or firing
decisions based on age but not on health factors.23
Federal law also safeguards the data of patients who undergo
treatment for alcohol or drug abuse in programs receiving federal
funds or subject to federal regulation. 24 These laws strive to ensure
confidentiality in order to encourage participation in alcohol and drug
treatment programs.125 As a result of these generally effective laws,
the best data protection for health information in the United States is
provided for patients who receive treatment for substance abuse in
federally-funded clinics.
The success of these federal statutes is grounded in the careful
way that they treat the issue of disclosure of patient information. To
begin with, they permit disclosure to take place only under certain
specified conditions. 26 Moreover, in place of "uninformed consent,"
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. 1993).
121. See generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 413,
434-37 (1991); Schultz, Wall St. J. at C20 (cited in note 34).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1988).
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). As a leading casebook has explained the matter, "The
employer... may terminate an ADEA covered employee for almost any reason other than
age.. . . An employer may fire for declining health, diminished vigor, reduced competence, or
even health problems related to advanced age. What the employer may not do is fire merely
because of the employee's age." Frolik and Barnes, Elderlaw at 163 (cited in note 22).
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 290dd-1 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
125. See Whyte v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 818 F.2d 1005, 1010 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating
that the relevant "regulations place the confidentiality necessary to ensure the success of
alcoholism treatment programs above [the need to use statements made during treatment as
evidence], and we must respect that decision"); Heartview Foundation v. Glaser, 361 N.W.2d
232, 235 (N.D. 1985) (stating "[w]ithout the assurance of confidentiality a number of individuals
may hesitate to seek treatment in alcohol- and drug-treatment programs")
126. The general standard of the law is that patient records are not to be disclosed. 42
U.S.C. § 290dd-2(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994). There are four exceptions to the general standard of
nondisclosure: (1) in accordance with the prior written consent of the patient; (2) to medical
personnel to the extent necessary to meet a medical emergency; (3) to qualified personnel to
conduct scientific research, audits, or program evaluations; and (4) if authorized by court order.
42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Of the four circumstances in which information pertaining to drug or alcohol abuse treat-
ments may be released, the two most important are court orders and patient consent. As for
disclosure pursuant to a court order, the judicial decision whether or not to release patient data
is to be made pursuant to a balancing test. The statutory test requires judicial disclosure "after
application showing good cause thereof," 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(b)(2)(C), and, more specifically,
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these laws carefully define the conditions necessary for the patient to
give "informed consent" to release data.127 Written consent to a disclo-
sure must include an explanation of matters such as: (1) the purpose
of disclosure; (2) how much and what kind of information is to be
disclosed; and (3) a statement that the consent is subject to revocation
at any time. 28 Each disclosure must also be accompanied by a written
statement that prohibits redisclosure. 29 These statutes not only offer
an excellent contrast to the "blanket" consent that frequently is found
elsewhere, but also show the potential for the success of additional
federal efforts to protect the privacy of medical information.
It should be mentioned again that these federal protections
generally apply only to government action. Only in strictly limited
circumstances does current federal law protect health care informa-
tion in the private sector. Thus, private clinics for substance abuse
that receive federal money are obliged to follow these federal rules for
medical information, but privately funded clinics are not. The
regulation of health care information is largely the province of state
law.
2. State Measures
Existing state law does not successfully overcome the weak-
nesses in current federal data protection. Although many different
kinds of legal provisions on the state level relate to medical informa-
tion, these measures do not create an effective system of data protec-
tion. First, some state constitutions, most notably California's, have
been interpreted as setting limits on the collection and dissemination
of medical data.30 Also, most states recognize that the relationship
states, "In assessing good cause the court shall weigh the public interest and the need for
disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient relationship, and to the
treatment services." Id. This balancing test is developed further by the applicable regulation.
42 C.F.R. 2.61-2.67 (1994).
The statutory balancing test and the regulations have been carefully applied by a number of
courts. These courts generally assess the seriousness of any alleged crime to have been
committed by the person against whom disclosure is sought and check to see that redisclosure of
the information will not occur beyond the immediate application necessary in the case at hand.
Whyte, 818 F.2d at 1009-12; State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 526 A.2d 1283, 1291-93 (1987);
Heartview Foundation v. Glaser, 361 N.W.2d 232, 233-35 (N.D. 1985); In the Matter of Baby X,
97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739-41 (1980); In the Matter of Dwayne G., 97 Misc. 2d 333,
411 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182-84 (Family Ct., Kings County 1978); United States v. Graham, 548 F.2d
1302, 1314 (8th Cir. 1977).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Cal. Const., Art. I, § 1. For cases construing California's constitutional right to
privacy, see, for example, Urbaniak v. Newton, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 277 Cal. Rptr. 354, 357-58
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between doctor and patient gives rise to a general duty of
confidentiality.' 3' Some states have extended this duty of confiden-
tiality to hospitals. 3 2
State statutes also require that certain reports concerning
specific diseases or medical conditions be filed with state health
authorities by physicians, hospitals, and laboratories. These reports
concern knife and gunshot wounds, sexually transmitted diseases,
HIV infection, and communicable diseases such as tuberculosis.33
Reports must also be fied about injuries to children or elderly
individuals that might indicate abuse.3 4 Despite the highly sensitive
nature of these public health data, state laws often contain neither
adequate limitations on the use of the information nor adequate
restrictions on the time for which these data will be stored.135
Some protection for medical privacy is also offered by common
law tort remedies. The common law right of privacy prevents public
disclosure of private facts.136 Most courts have, however, found that
such a claim requires widespread disclosure to the public, which will
not occur in most cases involving release of medical information.1 7
Another restrictive element of the public disclosure tort is that most
courts require disclosure to someone without a "legitimate interest" in
(1991); Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 156 Cal. Rptr. 55, 61-62
(1979).
131. See, for example, Cal. Civil Code § 56 (West 1982); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 146.82 (West
1989); R. I. Gen. Laws § 5-37-9 (1987). For cases interpreting this duty of confidentiality, see,
for example, Horne v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 S.2d 824, 827-30 (1974); Hague v. Williams, 37
N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345, 347-49 (1962).
132. See, for example, Cal. Civil Code § 56.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); Wisc. Stat. Ann. §
146.81 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994).
133. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 12-12-602 (1987) (reporting of knife and gunshot
wounds), 20-16-501 (1987) (reporting of "evidence suggestive of ... venereal diseases'; Cal.
Health & Safety Code § 199.21 (reporting of blood test regarding HIV). See Gellman, 62 N.C. L.
Rev. at 274-78 (cited in note 82).
134. See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-28-201 (1987); Ind. Code § 31-6-11-4 (1987); Mich.
Comp. Laws § 722.621 et seq. (1993 & Supp. 1994); New York Soc. Serv. Law §§ 411-428
(McKinney 1992).
135. Compare Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992 (2nd Cir. 1994) (striking down New York
system of maintaining data bank of suspected child abusers) with Arkansas Department of
Human Services v. Heath, 312 Ark. 206, 848 S.W.2d 927 (1993) (upholding Arkansas system of
maintaining a child abuse data bank that permits storing of "unsubstantiated repbrts').
136. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D at 383 (1977); W. Page Keeton, et al.,
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 117 at 856-63 (Foundation, 5th ed. 1984).
137. Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839, 841
(1976); Timperley v. Chase Collection Service, 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 77 Cal. Rptr. 782, 784
(1969). But see Miller v. Motorola, 202 ill. App. 3d 976, 560 N.E.2d 900, 902 (1990) (holding that
required communication must not be to the public at large, and a "special relationship" to the
specific "public' to whom the information is disclosed is needed); Keeton, et al., Prosser and
Keeton on Torts § 117 at 857-58 (criticizing the requirement of public disclosure).
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the information. 18 And, some courts consider employers to have such
a legitimate interest in much of their workers' medical information. 19
The tort right of privacy also prevents intentional intrusions
upon the private affairs or concerns of an individual.140 Such intru-
sions, however, must be "highly offensive."'1' This branch of the tort
also requires that "there... be something in the nature of prying or
intrusion."142 Miller v. Motorola'14 illustrates the weakness of this
intrusion tort for protecting medical privacy. In this case, an
employer disclosed sensitive medical information to the plaintiffs co-
workers.'44 The Illinois court found no "intrusion" on the plaintiff
because she had "voluntarily provided" the information to her em-
ployer. 145
Finally, a Uniform Health Care Information Practices Act has
been drafted.146  Only a small number of states, however, have
adopted this law.147 Since the Uniform Act is subject to modification
by state legislatures before passage, widespread adoption of this law
might not improve the level of protection for health care information.
These provisions have failed to impose a consistent framework
on the use of medical information by primary care providers,
supporting physicians, health care institutions, and secondary users.
This lack of uniformity is even more striking when one compares the
legal systems of different states. Yet, flows of health care information
now take place on an interstate level. As noted in one recent study:
A state-by-state approach to regulation of medical information does not reflect
the realities of modern healthcare finance and provision. The flow of medical
information is rarely restricted to the state in which it is generated. Such in-
formation is routinely transmitted to other states, subject to different legal re-
quirements, for a wide variety of purposes ranging from medical consultation
and research collaboration to governmental monitoring for quality.148
138. Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 117 at 857-58.
139. Id. But see Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701, 287 S.2d 824, 829-30 (1973) (holding that a
physician may be held liable for disclosing information to an employer).
140. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 652B at 378 (1977).
141. Id.
142. Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 117 at 855 (cited in note 136).
143. 202 M1. App. 3d 976, 560 N.E.2d 900 (1990).
144. Id. at 903.
145. Id.
146. Uniform Health Care Information Act, 9 (Part I) U.LA. 475 (1985 & Supp. 1994).
147. See Mont. Code Ann. § 50-16-501 (1987); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.02.005 (West
1991). For a discussion, see Lawrence 0. Gostin, et. al., Privacy and Security of Personal
Information in a New Health Care System, 270 J. A.M.A. 2487, 2490 (1993).
148. Gostin, et al., 270 JJ.MA. at 2489-90.
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Whether as a result of regional health care alliances or an increased
reliance on health data base organizations, national health care re-
form will increase transfers of medical information between different
states.
The interstate flow of medical information calls for a federal
response to these issues. The response should be embodied in a
specific law that regulates the processing of health care data.
Professor Spiros Simitis, an international data protection expert, has
urged an abandonment of any search for "abstract, generally
applicable provisions" in favor of "a context-bound allocation of infor-
mation embodied in a complex system of both specific and substantive
regulations.' '149 An essential element of a system of regulation for
health care information is the articulation of legally binding fair in-
formation practices. These fair information practices must be estab-
lished now as part of national health care reform-not at some date in
the future. In an age of rapid technological change, privacy lost is not
frequently regained. Indeed, once unfettered technology has caused
social expectations of privacy to sink, the law often chooses simply to
sanction this loss.15o
Data protection must be structured as an essential element of
health care reform; fair information practices must be part of the
same laws that authorize the collection and retrieval of personal
health care data. The Clinton Administration did set up many useful
privacy protections in the Health Security Act's Subtitle V.
Unfortunately, the act did not provide an entirely adequate structure
for fair information practices. The act proposed first the
establishment of an electronic data network of health care informa-
tion followed, some years later, by the creation of "a detailed proposal
for privacy protection legislation."'' The latter scheme, which was to
include detailed fair information practices, was to be submitted
149. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707,
742(1987).
150. The classic example of the law sanctioning the loss of privacy caused by technology
occurs when the Supreme Court searches for a "reasonable expectation of privacy" under the
Fourth Amendment. Compare Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality) (stating
that helicopters flying at 400 feet are not sufficiently rare in this country to create a reasonable
anticipation of not being observed from that altitude) with id. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that critical test under Fourth Amendment should be "whether, if the particular form
of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional re-
straints, the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society") (quoting Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 403 (1974)).
151. Health Security Act §§ 5120-5123 (cited in note 11).
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within three years of the enactment of the Health Security Act.152 In
fairness to the Clinton Administration, it should be stated that it did
prove responsive to demands for additional measures regarding
health care privacy, supporting an important Congressional effort in
this regard.153 Unfortunately, the resulting bill was not passed by
Congress.
Any delay in articulating fair information practices will allow
the rules of the road for the use of medical data to be shaped by seem-
ingly inexorable technological imperatives. Instead of an ex post facto
approach, privacy protection must be built into any health informa-
tion network at the time of its construction. 154
III. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Developments in Europe provide both an important example of
medical privacy protection and an independent additional ground for
the passage of a fair information practices act in this country. This
Part examines how national and transnational laws regulate the
processing of medical data in Europe, and analyzes how the
inadequate protection of medical data in the United States will lead to
the blocking of personal information transfers into our country and
will limit the ability of American companies to process European
records.
Within Europe, medical data are subject to a variety of legal
measures. As in the United States, data protection in European na-
tions begins with constitutional law. In the Federal Republic of
Germany, for example, an important constitutional right applies to all
personal information, including medical data.'5 5 Unlike the United
States, however, most European nations have enacted omnibus data
152. Id. at § 5122. The most detailed discussion of privacy issues in health care reform by
the Clinton Administration can be found in The Draft Report at 136-38 (cited in note 38). See
also Health Security Report at 57 (cited in note 11).
153. The bill in question, the Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994, is discussed in
Part IV.E.
154. The Committee on Regional Health Data Networks of the Institute of Medicine has
reached a similar conclusion. This organization not only advocates the enactment of a federal
fair information practices law, but urges Congress to act "as soon as possible." Institute of
Medicine Study at 191 (cited in note 40).
155. This right was first identified in an important decision of the German Constitutional
Court, 65 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 1 (1983). An English translation of
this case with excellent commentary is found in Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 332-36 (Duke U., 1989). Since this initial
decision, the German High Court has further developed this important right. See, for example,
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift ("NJW") 707 (1989), NJW 2805 (1987).
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protection laws that regulate both the public and private sectors. 156
These general laws are supplemented and strengthened by other laws
that contain more precise regulations for individual areas of
processing activities. In Germany, for example, medical data are
subject to the Federal Data Protection Law,157 the Code of Social Law
(Sozialgesetzbuch),58 the Criminal Code,159 the Civil Code,160 and state
data protection laws.161 The resulting level of data protection for
medical information in Europe, although not without flaws, is
generally at a far higher level than in the United States.
Some German examples will illustrate this high level of protec-
tion and demonstrate the possibility of future difficulties. The
Federal Data Protection Law regulates the possibility of transfers of
personal information for direct marketing purposes. 62 It generally
forbids transfers when the data in question relate to "health"
156. English translations of these laws are found in Spiros Simitis, Ulrich Dammann, and
Marita K6rner, eds., Data Protection in the European Union (Nomos, 1994) ("Data Protection
Statutes'). See generally Bennett, Regulating Privacy at 153-92 (cited in note 8); Flaherty,
Protecting Privacy at 21-39, 93-101, 165-74 (cited in note 8); Paul M. Schwartz, Das Ubersetzen
im Datenschutz Unterschiede zwischen deutschen und amerikischen Konzepten der ,,Privatheit,"
8 Recht der Datenverarbeitung 8 (1992).
157. Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Datenverarbeitung und des Datenschutzes vom
20.12.1990 (BGBl. I S.2954) ("German Data Protection Law'. An English translation of this
law can be found in Data Protection Statutes.
158. Sozialgesetzbuch, Zehntes Buch M10, vom 18.August 1980 (BGB1. I S. 1469) ("Code of
Social Law"). Critical elements of data protection are found in the fifth and tenth books of the
Code of Social Law. Sozialgesetzbuch, Zehntes Buch (X), Fanftes Buch (V). Important changes
have been made in both parts of the Social Law, see Zweites Gesetz zur Anderung des
Sozialgesetzbuchs vom 13.Juni 1994 (BGBl. I S.1229) (amending the tenth book of the Social
Law), Zweites Gesetz zur Anderung des Ffinften Buches Sozialgesetzbuch vom 20.12.91, BGB1. I
S.2325 (amending the fifth book of the Social Law).
159. Strafgesetzbuch, 203 I, Nr. 3.
160. Bdrgerliches Gesetzbuch § 134 ("Civil Code").
161. Among the most interesting state data protection laws are those found in the "new
states" (neue Ldnder), that is, the entities formed out of the former German Democratic
Republic. See, for example, Gesetz zum Schutz des Bfirgers beim Umgang mit seinen Daten
(Landesdatenschutzgesetz von Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) (Data Protection Law of
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) in Data Protection Statutes (cited in note 156); Gesetz zum der
informationellen Selbstbestimmung in Freistaat Sachsen (Data Protection Law of Saxony), in
Data Protection Statutes.
This special attention of the new German states to the need for informational privacy
extends to their constitutional law. Every one of the constitutions promulgated in the new
German states contains an explicit right to data protection. See Verfassung des Landes
Brandenburg (Constitution of Brandenburg), Art. 11; Verfassung des Landes Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (Constitution of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern), Art. 6; Verfassung des Freistaates
Sachsen (Constitution of Saxony), Art. 33; Verfassung des Landes Sachsen-Anhalt (Constitution
of Saxony-Anahlt), Art. 6; Verfassung des Freistaat Thfiringen (Constitution of Thuringia), Art.
6.
162. German Data Protection Law, § 28(2)(b) (cited in note 157).
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(gesundheitliche Verhdltnisse).1 3 The Code of Social Law'6 follows a
similar approach. It permits information, including medical data,
collected in the administration of social welfare programs to be
processed, stored, and transferred only when a specific legal measure
permits such action.165 This law contains no specific provision
allowing medical data to be used for direct marketing purposes. 16
Germany also forbids the transfer of personal patient data to
"clearinghouses" (Verrechnungsstellen) without patient consent.167
These services function as "factoring" enterprises; they purchase
debts owed physicians for private medical services at a discount and
then undertake to collect the amount owed.16s The Supreme Civil
Court found that this practice violated the physician's duty of
confidentiality as set out in the Civil Code and Criminal Code. 169 The
Court required that patients be informed of the physician's intent to
transfer patient data and give their consent in writing. 70
Health identification cards are an area of future difficulty in
Germany. Germany health insurance couples a guarantee of
universal access to medical care with global budgetary constraints on
physicians and hospitals.Y7' Beginning in the late 1980s, this
approach to health insurance ceased to contain health care
expenditures. 72 A critical part of the legal response to this situation
has been the aggressive use of data collection to control patient and
physician behavior. 73 The Health Reform Law of 1989 required that
all patients be furnished with machine-readable health insurance
163. Id. See Herbert Auernhammer, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz 375 (Carl Heymann, 3d ed.
1993).
164. Code of Social Law (cited in note 158).
165. Id. at §§ 67-78.
166. Id. at §§ 67c-78.
167. BGH, Judgment of July 10, 1991, NJW 2955 (1991) ("Supreme Civil Court Decision').
168. Id. at 2955-56.
169. Id at 2956-57. See Civil Code § 134 (cited in note 160); § 203 1 Nr. 1 Strafgesetzbuch
(cited in note 159).
170. Supreme Civil Court Decision at 2957 (cited in note 167). For a discussion of this
important decision, see Marita Krner-Dammann, Weitergabe von Patientendaten an arztliche
Verrechnungsstellen, NJW 729 (1992); Herbert Auernhammer, Zum Honorareinzug durch
drztliche Verrechnungsstellen, 16 Datenschutz und Datensicherung 182 (1992).
171. For an explanation of Germany's provision of medical services, see generally John K.
Iglehart, Germany's Health Care System, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 503 (1991) (first of two parts);
Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reforming the Health Care System: The Universal Dilemma, 19 Am. J. of
Law & Med. 21 (1993).
For a discussion of the reform of this system in the 1980s, see John K. Iglehart, Germany's
Health Care System, 324 New Eng. J. Med. 1750, 1751-55 (1991) (second of two parts); Jan
Kuhlmann, Die Verarbeitung von Patientendaten nach dem SGB V. und das Recht auf selbstbes-
timmte medizinische Behandlung, 17 Datenschutz und Datensicherung 198, 199-200 (1993).




cards by the start of 1995.174 Strict legal limits have been placed on
the type of information that can be stored on this card and on the
sharing of data generated through its use.175
Recently, however, numerous proposals have been made to
introduce more technically complex "chip cards.' 17s These identifica-
tion cards contain not a simple magnetic strip, such as that found on
most credit cards and the current German health identification card,
but a small silicon chip. 177 In pilot programs in Germany, such cards
are already being used to store health care information.178 A "chip
card" is already capable of storing the contents of a newspaper; in the
future, even greater storage capacity will be possible. 79 One day a
patient will be able to carry about her entire medical record on a
single plastic card.180  The data protection issues raised by this
technology are only beginning to be explored. Indeed, at present, no
social, political, or legal consensus has been reached about the
appropriate use of the chip card in the provision of medical services in
Germany.181 Data protection commissioners on the federal and state
levels are playing a critical role in leading the public discussion re-
garding the acceptability of this device. 82
A European-wide treaty also affects the level of protection for
medical information within any European nation. The Council of
Europe's Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data is a "non-self-executing
treaty"; its standards do not impose directly binding norms on
signatory nations. It does, however, require signatory nations to
establish domestic data protection laws that will give effect to the
174. Id. Among the most important uses of the information contained on these cards is
placing a global cap on the total cost of medical services that any given physician may furnish.
Id. at 204. A physician who exceeds the average costs of services in a given time period by more
than twenty percent is to be refused additional insurance compensation for this additional work.
Id.
175. Code of Social Law, Book V, §§ 284-305 (cited in note 158).
176. See generally Die Lunte Brennt, Der Spiegel 62, 68-72 (47/1994).
177. Id. See Rita Wellbrock, Chancen und Risiken des Einsatzes maschinenlesbarer
Patientenkarten, 18 Datenschutz und Datensicherung 70 (1994).
178. Der Hessische Datenschutzbeauftragte, 22. Tdtigheitsbericht 59-61 (1993) ("Twenty-
Second Activity Report of the Hessian Data Protection Commissioner").
179. Die Lunte Brennt, Der Spiegel at 66 (cited in note 176).
180. Id. at 78-79; Wellbrock, 18 Datenschutz und Datensicherung at 70 (cited in note 177).
181. Die Lunte Brennt, Der Spiegel at 78-79; Wellbrock, 18 Datenschutz und
Datensicherung at 74.
182. See Landesbeauftragte fuir den Datenschutz, Bremen, 16. Jahresbericht 63-66 (1994);
Landesdatenschutzbeauftragte fur den Datenschutz, Bremen, Arztliche Behandlung und
Abrechnung der Leistungen demnechst nur noch mit Chipkarte, 16 Datenschutz und
Datensicherung 276 (1992); Twenty-Second Activity Report of the Hessian Data Protection
Commissioner at 58-93 (cited in note 178).
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convention's principles. The convention, the most important existing
European agreement for data protection, requires signatory nations to
permit the processing of sensitive data, including "personal data
concerning health," only when "domestic law provides appropriate
safeguards."'183 Such safeguards include rights of access and correc-
tion; a specification of collection purposes; data security measures;
and limitations on unnecessary data collection and data uses that are
incompatible with the original collection purpose.84 In addition,
national laws must provide remedies for lack of compliance with
requirements regarding collection of personal data, access to one's
personal data, and correction of personal data. 185
The convention's provisions apply to all processing of personal
data. These omnibus protections have been expanded by the Council
of Europe's Recommendation No.R(81) 1, which provides narrower
regulations for automated medical data banks.186 These regulations
provide additional data protection for collections of health care data.
The recommendation's requirements "are to be taken duly into
account not only with regard to medical data banks which are
operational, but also those which are in the developmental phase."' 87
The new Draft Recommendation on the Protection of Medical Data
will provide even more detailed, and in many respects stronger,
protection for medical data.88 Taken together, the convention and
recommendations reflect a serious European-wide commitment to
data protection in the medical domain.
In addition to the Council of Europe's convention and
recommendations, the treatment of health care information within
Europe will soon be affected by the Commission of the European
Union's Directive on Data Protection. This directive relies on
183. Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, no. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), Article 6 ("European
Convention").
184. Id. at Articles 5, 7, 8.
185. Id. at Article 8(d).
186. Council of Europe, Regulations for Automated Medical Data Banks, Recommendation
No.R(81)1 (Jan. 23, 1981). The Explanatory Memorandum to the Recommendation states:
the operation of every automated medical data bank [should be] subject to a specific set
of regulations. The general purpose of these regulations should be to guarantee that
medical data are used not only to ensure optimum medical care and services but also in
such a way that the data subject's dignity and physical and mental integrity are fully re-
spected.
Id. at 13.
187. Id. at 7.




domestic legal institutions for its transformation into law.189 Yet, in
contrast to the Council of Europe's Convention on Data Protection, the
Directive on Data Protection offers a more powerful vehicle for
harmonization of European law through its greater detail and the
possibility of direct reliance on the directive should it not be
implemented correctly into domestic law.19o
An amended draft of this document provides insights into the
European Union's likely ultimate approach to medical data protec-
tion.19' Like the convention, the Draft Directive requires member
countries to establish legislation that conforms with its standards. Its
goal is to ensure a "high level of protection" within the Union for
"fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy.' '192
The directive stresses that fair information practices must be in place
before member states permit the processing of personal information,
including "data concerning health."'193 Put another way, without suffi-
cient data protection, the processing of medical information may not
occur.
The proposed directive and the Council of Europe's convention
are of great significance. They are important in the first instance as
positive examples of data protection measures for medical data. They
are also important because they set rules not only for the processing
of personal data within the European Union, but also for the transfer
of these data to any "third country," including the United States. 94
The council's convention and the Union's directive permit the
prohibition of data transfers, including those involving medical infor-
mation, to countries with insufficient data protection. 95 According to
the Council of Europe's convention, a signatory nation may prohibit
data transfers to third countries that occur "through the intermediary
of the territory of another Party."196 Such indirect transfers can be
blocked when they would cause the circumvention of specific height-
189. George A. Bermann, Roger J. Goebel, William J. Davey, and Eleanor M. Fox, Cases
and Materials on European Community Law 278 (West, 1993).
190. Stephen Weatherill and Paul Beaumont, EC Law 32, 116-17, 296-99 (Penguin, 1993).
191. Commission of the European Communities, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive
on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, COM(92)-SYN 287 ("Draft Directive').
192. Id. at Preamble (1).
193. Id. at Article 8.
194. Id. at Article 26.
195. Id.; European Convention, Article 12 (cited in note 183).
196. European Convention, Article 12 (3)(b).
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ened regulations for certain categories of data. 197 Although the
convention does not discuss the treatment of direct transfers to third
countries,198 the council's Draft Recommendation on the Protection of
Medical Data does. It requires domestic legal provisions which are "in
conformity with [the] Convention" before permitting a transfer of
personal information to a state which has not ratified the treaty.199
The draft directive gives responsibility to each national gov-
ernment within the Community to oversee the conditions of transfers
to non-Community nations. Its critical requirement is that data
transfers be permitted "only if the third country in question ensures
an adequate level of protection."200 The adequacy of protection is to be
"assessed in the light of all the circumstances surrounding a data
transfer operation or set of data transfer operations.201 Among the
circumstances to be assessed are "the legislative provisions . . . in
force in the third country in question."202 The adequacy of protection
can also depend on "professional rules," such as a given company's
business practices or code of conduct. 203
Data exports can also be limited under the laws of various
European nations. The French Law on Data Processing, Data Files,
and Individual Liberties allows the French data protection agency,
the National Commission on Informatics and Liberties, to prohibit the
transfer of information from France to foreign nations.20 4 In one in-
stance, the commission prevented Fiat from transferring employee
data from France to Italy.25 In Germany, the Federal Data Protection
Law requires consideration of the data protection provided by a third
country before any international transmission of personal informa-
197. Id. at Article 12(3)(a). For analysis of this provision of the convention, see Joel R.
Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to Transitional Financial Services,
60 Fordham L. Rev. S137, S161-62 (1992).
198. The convention has, however, been interpreted as requiring equivalent protection in
non-signatory nations. Spiros Simitis, Datenschutz und Europdische Gemeinschaft, 6 Recht der
Datenverarbeitung 3, 11 (1990).
199. Draft Recommendation at 11.4 (cited in note 188). The Draft Recommendation adds
that such transfers may occur even in the absence of such conformity if "a. necessary measures,
including of a contractual nature, to respect the principles of the Convention and this
Recommendation have been taken and the data subject has the possibility to object to the
transfer, or b. the data subject has given his consent." Id.




204. French Data Protection Law at Article 24, in Data Protection Statutes (cited in note
156).
205. Commission nationale de l'informatique et des liberths, lOe rapport d'activit6 32-34
(1991).
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tion.206 Such analysis must be carried out in transfers by the
government and private companies alike. °7 In cases of non-govern-
mental transmissions, a private company may be subject to fines and
even criminal penalties for transmissions from Germany to countries
with insufficient protections.20 8
What do these provisions for blocking data exports under the
Council of Europe's convention, the Union's directive, and national
laws mean for the United States? They indicate that transfers of
personal data from Europe to America depend upon the adequacy of
protection that such data receive once transferred here. The decision
whether to transfer is likely to be made after examining the nature of
the data, the type of protection offered by the legal order, and the
business practices in the United States.209
Medical data likely to be affected by these measures are found
in a number of areas. To begin with, international corporations often
send employee records containing health information from one coun-
try to another.210 Moreover, there exists an international industry in
information processing. American companies are part of this indus-
try; they compete globally for contracts that involve the processing of
health information.11 American litigants also seek personal medical
information from Europe through discovery motions. American courts
must now weigh the effect of foreign data protection statutes in
evaluating the permissibility of contested international discovery
actions involving personal information.212 Indeed, the Supreme Court
206. German Data Protection Law §§ 17, 28 (cited in note 157). For a discussion of the
need for equivalent protection before the transfer of personal data from Germany to a foreign
country, see Spiros Simitis, § 1 (Rdumlicher Geltungsbereich), in Spiros Simitis, Ulrich
Dammann et. al. eds., Kommentar zum Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, § 1, Rdnr. 74-107 (4th ed.
1992).
207. German Data Protection Law §§ 43, 44. An individual section in the Social Law
regulates international transmissions of personal data in the control of social welfare agencies,
see Code of Social Law, Tenth Book § 77 (cited in note 158). This statute permits such trans-
mission to be made only for a limited number of statutorily authorized purposes and only when
there is no negative effect on an interest of the individual that is worthy of protection. Id.
208. Id.
209. Draft Directive at 26(2) (cited in note 191). For a description of the necessary analysis,
see Spiros Simitis, Datenschutz und Europdische Gemeinschaft, 6 Recht der Datenverarbeitung
3, 20 (1990).
210. Such information was present in the Fiat case discussed above. See note 205 and
accompanying text.
211. See generally Priscilla M. Regan, The Globalization of Privacy: Implications of Recent
Changes in Europe, 52 Am. J. of Econ. & Soc. 257, 264-65 (1993).
212. See generally Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987) (concerning the multi-factor balancing test to
be applied to decide whether foreign parties must comply with a discovery request forbidden by
foreign law).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
has held that American courts have a special responsibility to
"demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by the
foreign litigant on account of its nationality or the location of its op-
eration, and for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.213
The Supreme Court has approved a multi-factor balancing test to be
applied in deciding whether foreign parties must comply with a
discovery request that is forbidden by their domestic law.2' 4 Under
this balancing test, foreign data protection laws should be entitled to
great deference due to the importance foreign nations place on privacy
protection.215
Finally, American drug companies market their products in-
ternationally. Because drugs tend to be approved more rapidly in
Europe than in the United States, personal medical information from
Europe can have an important role in the regulation of pharmaceuti-
cal products in this country.216  In fact, the Food and Drug
Administration even requires companies whose products have been
approved to share information regarding "all adverse drug experience
information obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any
source, foreign or domestic.... "21 Yet, access to this information may
be limited if foreign countries believe American protections
inadequate.
Thus, the weaknesses in data protection law in the United
States may lead to a blockage of international transfers of data to this
213. Id. at 544-46. See also Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 437(1) (ALI, 1987).
214. Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at 544 n. 28. See also Richmark Corporation v. Timber
Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1476 (9th Cir. 1992).
215. Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at 544 n. 28. Foreign data protection laws are to be re-
garded not as "blocking statutes," such as have been developed in the context of antitrust laws,
see generally Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Orders In Antitrust Litigation, 88
Yale L. J. 612 (1979); Timothy G. Smith, Note, Discovery of Documents Located Abroad in U.S.
Antitrust Litigation, 14 Va. J. Int'l Law 747 (1974), but as "substantive laws at variance with
the law of the United States." Societe Nationale, 482 U.S. at 544 n. 29 (cited in note 213)
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 437 (Reporter's Note 5 at 41) (cited in note
213)).
216. This point was made clear by a scandal in the early 1980s involving the drug
benoxaprofen, which was marketed by Eli Lilly under the tradename Oraflex. Information from
the United Kingdom indicated adverse drug reactions to this product, and a Congressional
hearing before the Committee on Government Operations probed the issue of whether Lilly had
promptly shared this information with the FDA. See The Regulation of New Drugs by the Food
and Drug Administration: the New Drug Review Process, Hearings before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 76-84 (1982).
During these hearings, the head of the Food and Drug Administration noted that privacy
issues lead "many countries [to] hesitate to give us in the FDA certain information which they
consider as privileged-and under their law is--and that they think might be helpful to us
scientifically." Id. at 121.
217. 21 C.F.R. 314.80(b), (c) (1994) (emphasis added).
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country.218 Even when such transfers are not forbidden, the transac-
tions in which they are involved will be subject to heightened scru-
tiny. The inevitable result of these blockages and this scrutiny will be
dramatically increased costs to American businesses and litigants
with interests in personal information from Europe. In the absence of
federal protection of medical data, the flow of personal data from
Europe to the United States will be less rapid, less regular, and asso-
ciated with greater economic costs. It makes economic sense for the
United States to institute federal data protection measures for medi-
cal data. Without such measures, American enterprises will be at a
competitive disadvantage.
IV. TOWARD AN AMERICAN DATA PROTECTION LAW
Clearly, the United States has not been successful in protect-
ing the privacy of health care information. However, a core of fair
information practices can be ascertained by considering other areas of
domestic law and by looking at European law. Four important ele-
ments of the necessary American data protection law can be identi-
fied: (1) the creation of a statutory fabric that defines obligations
with respect to the uses of personal information; (2) the maintenance
of transparent processing systems; (3) an assignment of limited proce-
dural and substantive rights to the data subject; and (4) the estab-
lishment of effective governmental oversight of data use. These ele-
ments must be set out in legal standards that control the collection
and use of personal medical information.
A. Creation of a Statutory Fabric of Defined Obligations
The first important element in the regulation of American
health privacy is the creation of a statutory fabric that defines obliga-
tions with respect to the uses of personal information.219 The goal of
these obligations regarding data processing is to respect and
encourage the individual's personal autonomy. But, any assignment
of rights to individuals must be limited in scope. The law should not
create an absolute right of control or a quasi-property interest in one's
218. Regan, 52 Am. J. of Econ. & Soc. at 264-65 (cited in note 211).
219. The Privacy Protection Study Commission has stated that privacy protection depends
on legislation and other forms of regulation that "create and define obligations with respect to
the uses and disclosures that will be made of recorded information about an individual."
Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy at 15 (cited in note 66).
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personal data. Such an approach would do more harm than good
because of the variety of critical social interests that can support
access to any individual's personal data. Any rights in personal data
must be anchored within a larger statutory setting of limits on how
personal health care information can and cannot be used.
From this perspective, a critical problem with the current legal
regulation of medical information is that it is centered around dis-
crete health care relationships rather than health care data. As a
result, data that are subject to statutory protection in the hands of
one entity, such as a physician or hospital, may be largely free from
legal controls once transferred to another actor, such as an insurance
company.220 A statutory scheme that effectively controls medical data
must be tied to and follow the data throughout their different uses.
Once identifiable health information is created or used during the
process of medical treatment or payment, it should remain protected
health information that is subject to fair information practices.
A statutory fabric to protect health care information must
include the definition of a core set of responsibilities for those who
process such information. Indeed, those who handle the information
should be considered "trustees" whose responsibilities are statutorily
defined.221 Here, the law should center its attention on both the use
and the disclosure of information. Use of health care information
should only be permitted for reasons that are compatible with the
purpose for which the information was collected. The principle of
compatibility requires a significant degree of convergence-a concrete
relationship-between the purpose for which the information was
gathered and its subsequent use.222
Disclosure of health data should only be allowed for statutorily
authorized purposes or with the patient's informed consent. Here,
careful drafting will be necessary so that disclosure standards contain
some measure of flexibility without creating loopholes that will permit
220. See David F. Linowes, Privacy in America: Is Your Private Life in the Public Eye? 125
(U. of Illinois, 1989) (arguing that laws regulating the insurance industry "need to be more
comprehensive, covering personal privacy protections in all their dimensions").
221. The Code of Fair Information Practices for Health Information before the House of
Representatives in the last Congress developed at some length this concept of a "trustee" for
health care information, see H.R. 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (March 21, 1994) §§ 3, 101, 102,
111. See also 141 Cong. Rec. E63 (daily ed. Jan. 9, 1995) (reintroducing this legislation in the
104th Congress). Health care professionals are, in fact, already considered to be fiduciaries with
a special duty to disclose all information to the patient which materially affect her rights and
interests. See, for example, Arato v. Avedon, 5 Cal. 4th 1172, 858 P.2d 598, 602 (1993).
222. For important decisions developing this concept within the context of the Privacy Act,
see Britt v. Naval Investigative Serv., 886 F.2d 544, 549-50 (3d Cir. 1989); Covert v. Harrington,
876 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1989).
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abuse of privacy. The most critical categories of statutorily author-
ized disclosures are: (1) for treatment and payment; (2) for quality
control (including physician monitoring); (3) to next of kin (if such
disclosure is consistent with accepted medical practice) ;223 (4) for
public health reporting; (5) for health research; and (6) for law en-
forcement purposes. Each statutory category should articulate the
limited conditions under which the permitted disclosure is to take
place.
The kinds of conditions to be placed on these authorized
disclosures may be illustrated with reference to health research
projects and public health reporting. In the United States, academic
health research projects are already reviewed by institutional boards
for compliance with a variety of ethical standards.224 Drawing on this
established safeguard, a health research disclosure must be made
only to projects that have already met with the approval of an
independent institutional review board or similar entity. The health
reform bill of Senator George Mitchell proposed the establishment of a
process by which the Secretary of Health and Human Services would
certify institutional review boards in the public and private sectors.2 5
The certification process would insure that the review boards would
have the "qualifications to ... protect the confidentiality of research
subjects. '226 Part of the activity of review boards is to insure that at
the earliest possible date all identifiable information used in health
research projects be turned into aggregate data that cannot identify
particular individuals.
223. To be sure, this practice is not entirely settled. Considerable debate has taken place
concerning disclosures of HIV information to partners. See Roger Doughty, The Confidentiality
of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health
Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 113, 163-75 (1994). See generally Edgar
and Hazel Sandomire, Medical Privacy Issues in the Age of AIDS: Legislative Opinions, 16 Am.
J. L. & Med. 155 (1990); Richard C. Turkington, Confidentiality Policy for HPV-Related
Information: An Analytical Framework for Sorting Out Hard and Easy Cases, 34 Vill. L. Rev.
871 (1989).
In the context of abortion, the Supreme Court has held unconstitutional a state requirement
that a pregnant woman sign a statement indicating that she notified her husband of her inten-
tion to obtain an abortion, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennslyvania v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992), and upheld a requirement that one parent give informed consent before a
pregant minor can obtain an abortion-so long as this law also contains a judicial bypass proce-
dure. Id. at 2832.
224. Kathryn Kelly and Sara Jones, Tort Liability, Immunities, and Defenses, in Anne M.
Dellinger, ed., Healthcare Facilities Law 257, 368-77 (Little, Brown, 1991).
225. Health Security Act, Mitchell Amendment No. 2560 to S.2351, § 5218(c)(2), in 140




Disclosure for the purpose of public health reporting should
only be permitted pursuant to an acceptable public health reporting
statute. Such a statute must contain specific sufficient limitations on
the use of health care information. These safeguards must include
limitations on the time for which these data may be stored in indi-
vidually identifiable form. Such standards would provide a powerful
incentive for state legislatures to redraft the public health reporting
laws that are currently couched in broad or vague terms. The
drafting of such carefully crafted conditions for disclosure is
absolutely essential; in addition, other protections will be needed to
prevent abuse of the notion of informed consent. Part IV.C discusses
the content of these safeguards.
B. The Maintenance of Transparent Processing Systems
The second element of an American data protection law, the
maintenance of transparent processing systems, requires that the use
of personal information be structured to make it open and under-
standable to citizens.227 An open data protection law requires the
state to organize the processing of personal information in a manner
that encourages self-determination. While secret files and the im-
penetrable ways of computers discourage decision making and provide
opportunities to coerce the individual, an understanding of how
information is obtained and used encourages citizens to assert
themselves in the spheres of social and political life.
The transparency element of a data protection law requires
that citizens understand how their medical information will be used.
This knowledge should be imparted through a "notice of information
practices" that is given to individuals. American law already has
some experience with such documents; the Privacy Act requires use of
such a notice mechanism.22 8 A health care data protection act should
227. In the words of the Privacy Protection Study Commission in 1977, an effective privacy
policy must "open up record-keeping operations." Privacy Protection Study Commission,
Personal Privacy at 14 (cited in note 66). This body's official report stated, "The Commission
believes that by opening up record-keeping practices and by giving an individual opportunities
to interact easily with a record keeper, particularly at crucial points in a record-keeping rela-
tionship, both individuals and organizations will benefit." Id. at 19.
228. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3) (1988). The Privacy Act requires an agency to "inform each
individual whom it asks to supply information, on the form which it uses to collect the
information or on a separate form that can be retained by the individual" of the legal authority
authorizing the solicitation of the personal information, the principal purposes for which the
information will be used, the routine uses planned for the information, and the effects, if any, of
not providing the personal information. Id. Unfortunately, the Privacy Act has not created
effective notice of federal data use. See Flaherty, Protecting Privacy at 341 (cited in note 8)
(explaining that the general public is unaware of the protections the Privacy Act affords). Part
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establish a notice requirement with four elements, the first two
describing the individual's rights and the last two specifying the
purposes of collection.
First, the notice requirement must provide a description of the
individual's rights, including the extent of access provided to her own
records. Second, notice must include an explanation of the procedures
under which these rights can be exercised. Part of a patient's general
right to inspect and possess a copy of her medical information should
include the power to seek correction of any health information that is
not timely, accurate, or complete.229 Third, the notice requirement
must give an explanation of the purposes for collection of personal
medical data.230 The patient should know how and by whom this
information will be used.23' Fourth, and finally, the notice
requirement must include a specification of the extent of the
authorized disclosure of collected data. This specification would
explain the nature of the authorization of disclosures and the
substantive limits on additional unrelated use of the information.
Only this knowledge, provided by the notice requirement, would allow
the individual to play a role in preventing collection, storage, and use
of unnecessary information.232
C. Assignment of Limited Procedural and Substantive Rights
The third element of an American data protection law is the
assignment of limited procedural and substantive rights to the indi-
vidual. As has been previously noted, an individual's control over
medical or other personal information cannot be absolute. Therefore,
the role of data protection law is to shape personal rights to reflect a
balance between individual and social interests in medical data.
of the problem is that the limited nature of remedies offered under the Privacy Act reduces the
importance of the procedural and substantive interests assigned by this statute to the
individual.
229. Narrowly crafted statutory exceptions to this right of inspection should exist for some
data, the most important of which are certain kinds of mental health treatment records.
230. Such a requirement is known to both European and United States law, see the
European Convention at Article 14(3)(c) (cited in note 183); Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)
(1988).
231. For shortcomings in the execution of such explanations in the context of American
welfare law and child support enforcement, see Schwartz, 43 Hastings L. J. at 1352-74 (cited in
note 8).
232. See Bennett, Regulating Privacy at 156-58 (cited in note 8) (discussing necessary




Procedural interests of the individual in personal medical
information include: (1) the right to be informed whether one is re-
quired to supply medical information; and (2) the right to have a
mechanism by which one can inspect and correct data. Such proce-
dural rights also serve to guarantee the transparency of data process-
ing.233
The assignment of rights to the individual also requires the
shaping of effective remedies. A modern remedial scheme should
entail three kinds of protections. First, any individual whose
interests under a health care information practices law have been
violated must be permitted to bring a civil action with the possibility
of monetary penalties. Second, methods of alternative dispute
resolution should be available to encourage affordable relief and
timely resolution of claims.2 4  Third, violations of certain fair
information practices should be punishable by criminal penalties. For
example, criminal sanctions should apply to the obtaining of protected
health care information under false pretenses with the intent to apply
such information for monetary gain.
2. Substantive Rights
Informed consent to the use of medical data is another impor-
tant individual right. In the context of physical treatment, the mean-
ing of informed consent is far from settled. In a recent analysis of the
doctrine, Peter Schuck has differentiated between two forms of in-
formed consent: one version developed by "idealists" and the other
version developed by "realists."235 Informed consent idealists advocate
an expansive obligation of the physician to disclose information about
risks and alternatives and also concentrate on the patient's actual
233. Transparency is the second necessary element of an adequate data protection law.
See Part N.B.
234. For a discussion of the application of alternative dispute resolution within the context
of medical malpractice, see Kelly and Jones, Tort Liability at 377-86 (cited in note 224). The
Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange has also stressed the potential contribution of
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in resolving disputes about fair information prac-
tices. Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange, 1993 Report at 3-9 (cited in note 44).
235. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L. J. 899, 902-04, (1994). For
an example of the idealists, see generally Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient
(Free, 1984); for an example of a realist, see Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some
Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent and the Plea Bargain, 84 Yale L.
J. 683, 690-94 (1975).
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knowledge or understanding in giving consent.236  In contrast,
informed consent realists emphasize "the process of informing the
citizen for decision. 2 37 Realists focus on developing objective stan-
dards concerning the conduct of the informing authority.
Whatever the merits of the different sides of the debate regard-
ing "informed consent" before physical treatment, the realist view is
preferable for disclosure concerning data processing. As Schuck
notes, "most health care in the future will be delivered in a highly
bureaucratic-technocratic context."238 Under these circumstances, it
makes little sense to require that informed consent to data processing
be based on a physician and patient engaging in a dialogue that will
lead to shared decision making about the application of the patient's
personal information. In fact, the health care provider and patient
are already required to disclose, without the patient's express con-
sent, medical data for many data processing uses. For example, the
physician and patient cannot agree to opt out of sharing information
with the third party payor; society has also made the judgment that
data must be shared under certain circumstances for epidemiological
or other public health purposes.
Informed consent to the release of personal data requires "the
process of informing for agreement.'239 This language means that
health care providers must provide patients with information regard-
ing specific planned uses of personal medical data. In light of the
current abuse of informed consent through the use of blanket disclo-
sure documents, careful new safeguards are required. These safe-
guards should anchor the right of informed consent within a legal
framework of standards for use and disclosure of data and also in-
clude limits on the conditions under which the process of informing
for agreement is to take place.
In establishing this new approach, the law should also recon-
sider its current overreliance on the concept of written documentation
of informed consent. Blanket consent forms, while written, are
inadequate to obtain truly informed consent. Health care data should
only be processed for a statutorily authorized purpose or with the
patient's informed consent. This approach requires the articulation of
a limited set of statutory conditions under which permitted use or
disclosures may occur. Once patients are informed about the planned
236. Schuck, 103 Yale L. J. at 903; Katz, The Silent World at 165-206.
237. Goldstein, 84 Yale L. J. at 692 (cited in note 235).
238. Schuck, 103 Yale L. J. at 926 (cited in note 235).
239. See Goldstein, 84 Yale L. J. at 692 (cited in note 235).
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use of their information, it may be used only in these statutorily
defined circumstances. Once a health care provider gives information
regarding the planned use, including an explanation of the "notice of
fair information practices," the patient's consent to an application for
a statutorily defined purpose need not be memorialized in writing. In
circumstances in which a use or disclosure is not statutorily
authorized, formal documentation of consent will be required. This
approach will lead individuals to scrutinize closely all situations in
which they are asked to sign consent documents for the use of their
health care information.
Additional safeguards may sometimes be needed to insure that
consent is given in a process that is informative. In circumstances in
which formal documentation of informed consent is required because
a nonauthorized use or disclosure is involved, consent may not be
given on the same day that the individual seeks health care.
Moreover, the provision of care may never be made contingent on the
signature of the consent document for a nonauthorized purpose. In
addition, any consent should only remain valid for a limited period
and for a purpose that has been explained to the patient in writing.240
This approach to informed consent has considerable merit in
requiring written authorizations only in situations in which patient
scrutiny is most critical. In all situations where protected health
information is generated, however, patients are to receive notice of
the planned data uses and have an opportunity to refuse consent.
D. Establishment of Governmental Oversight
The fourth and final element of an American data protection
law is government monitoring of information processing. The protec-
tion of informational self-determination in an age of rapid technologi-
cal change mandates the creation of a governmental body with the
institutional expertise and continuity of interest to understand the
impact of changes in this area and draw attention to the need for
improvements in legal regulation.241 This oversight is particularly
important in the medical sector where the greatest changes in per-
sonal data use are likely to take place. The idea of creating such an
240. These safeguards are already contained in the provisions that protect confidentiality
in the records of federally funded substance abuse clinics, see notes 127-29 and accompanying
text.
241. For further discussion of the need for a data protection board, see Schwartz, 43
Hastings L. J. at 1379-86 (cited in note 8); Office of Technology Assessment, Protecting Privacy
in Information at 86-87 (cited in note 33).
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institution has been part of policy discussions since the debate preced-
ing the creation of the Privacy Act in 1974242 and is likely today to
receive particularly strong support from the American people. A 1993
poll indicated that eighty-six percent of the American public favored
the creation of an "independent National Medical Privacy Board" that
would "hold hearings, issue regulations, and enforce standards. '12 4
Drawing on past American legislative proposals and the inter-
national experience with such institutions, it is possible to spell out
the duties of a United States Data Protection Board. Ideally, such an
entity would be a general privacy protection agency rather than one
restricted to health care issues. This broader authority is needed
because informational privacy issues are cross-sectoral in nature.244
The regulation of health care data, for example, raises issues not only
in health law but also in administrative law, labor law, and fair credit
law. Therefore, the creation of a general United States Data
Protection Board would heighten the administrative expertise
necessary to provide proper oversight of health care data.
A United States Data Protection Board would be of assistance
to numerous social groups. Its monitoring of both data processing
practices and compliance with laws would draw the attention of the
legislature and the public to weaknesses in existing laws and assist
citizens seeking to protect their interests and exercise their rights.
The board would also help businesses understand and comply with
legal requirements. By fulfilling these tasks, the data protection
commission would keep public administrators, the legislature, citi-
zens, and the business community aware and involved in the debate
over privacy as new conflicts generated by information technology
emerge.
A further role of a Data Protection Commission would be to
represent American interests and assist American companies who
face scrutiny by foreign data privacy authorities. Virtually all other
Western nations have created such agencies for data protection over-
242. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-1416, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in U.S. Congress,
Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, 3-8 (1976) ("Legislative History of Privacy Act)
(remarks of Senator Sam Ervin introducing a bill to establish a Federal Privacy Board). The
policy debate at this time has been explored by Flaherty, Protecting Privacy at 310-15 (cited in
note 8) and Bennett, Regulating Privacy at 170-73 (cited in note 8).
243. Health Information Privacy Survey at 11 (cited in note 1).
244. Data protection boards in Europe and Canada are, in fact, constructed on this general-
ist model, see Flaherty, Protecting Privacy at 21-26, 93-101, 165-72, 243-48 (cited in note 8);
Paul M. Schwartz, Administrative Law: The Oversight of Data Protection Law, 39 Am. J. Comp.
L. 618, 619 (1991) (book review of Flaherty, Protecting Privacy).
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sight.2 5 Indeed, the European Commission's Draft Directive requires
each member state to "designate an independent public authority to
supervise the protection of personal data."246 Significant formal and
informal contacts now occur regularly between the world's data pro-
tection commissioners.247 The United States needs to create an
American Data Protection Commission before it can play a full role in
these important international discussions.
In the current political environment, considerable opposition
exists to the creation of an additional federal institution for any rea-
son. Americans are suspicious of their government and do not wish to
create any more bureaucracy.248 Meetings of the world's data protec-
tion commissioners indicate, however, that this hostility toward state
activity limits American participation in the important world
discussion about international data transfers. In a broader sense,
deliberative autonomy is not merely a pre-existing quality whose
protection requires an absence of state power. Protection of medical
privacy requires that difficult choices be made regarding the structur-
ing of the flow of personal data. A data protection board can play a
critical role in ensuring that these decisions be made in a fashion that
will further informational autonomy.
E. Responding to Current Abuses of Medical Privacy
Creation of an American data protection law satisfying these
four elements would respond to the abuses that this Article has iden-
tified. The appropriate response must remedy two types of abuses:
(1) the trafficking of lists of health care information by direct market
mailers; and (2) employer access to worker medical data through
wellness programs and health insurance plans. After considering the
response to these two situations, this Part discusses two bills
introduced in the last Congress whose passage is essential to the
creation of an adequate law for protection of health care data.
First, the marketing of lists of health care data must be
blocked by a federal health care data protection act.249 This law
245. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy at 21-29, 93-103, 165-74, 243-52.
246. Draft Directive at Article 30 (cited in note 191).
247. An important number of these contacts occur at the Annual Meeting of Data
Protection Commissioners. The 1994 meeting in the Netherlands marked the sixteenth year
that this official encounter has taken place among the world's data protection commissioners.
248. See Schuck, 103 Yale L. J. at 901 (cited in note 235) (noting Americans have an
"abiding, almost obsessive suspicion of state power).
249. Some attempts at self-regulation by the direct marketing industry have taken place.
The Direct Marketing Association ("DMA") has created an opt-out provision for individuals,
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should not contain a statutory authorization for the disclosure of
health care information to direct market mailers. Rather, statutory
authorizations should be limited to a core minimum of necessary or
highly useful social applications. Although receiving product mailings
and telephone solicitations might reduce the information costs of
consumers, American law, to the extent that it has considered the
issue, has not generally found this interest to be important enough to
permit unrestricted release of personal information. A recent
Supreme Court decision is illustrative of this point.
In Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 0 the United States Supreme Court reviewed an attempt
under the Freedom of Information Act by two unions to obtain the
home addresses of federal agency employees from the Department of
Defense. These employees had been designated as belonging to bar-
gaining units represented by the labor organizations. The Supreme
Court identified a significant privacy interest in the nondisclosure of
the names and addresses of the workers.251 The Court found that this
privacy interest was protected under the Freedom of Information
Act's Section (b)(6) disclosure exemption. In fact, the access that
"commercial advertisers and solicitors" would have to this information
was an important factor for the Supreme Court in evaluating the
weight of the privacy interest at stake.252 In its opinion, the Court
also emphasized the importance of "the interest that individuals have
in preventing at least some unsolicited, unwanted mail from reaching
them at their homes. '2 53 It found that the Department of Defense was
prohibited from releasing the information to the two unions.
Just as no statutory authorization should permit the disclosure
of health care information to direct market mailers, the normal use of
these data by physicians and hospitals should not entail such a re-
lease. Such a use is not compatible with the purpose for which physi-
industry guidelines, and a privacy manual for direct marketers. See Direct Marketing
Association, Fair Information Practices Manual (1994); Paul M. Alberta, DMA Unveils Privacy-
Practices Book, Direct Marketing News 6 (Aug. 8, 1994).
Considerable doubt exists as to the extent of consumer knowledge of the opt-out provision
and the extent to which the industry is committed to compliance with the DMA's guidelines.
See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 Iowa L. Rev. __ (1995) (forthcoming). Indeed, Metromail, a member of the Privacy
Task Force of the DMA, created profiles of millions of Americans with specific health conditions.
See id.; Ray Schulz, Carlson, Metromail Offer Medical Data, Direct Marketing News 2 (June 21,
1993).
250. 113 S. Ct. 1006 (1993).
251. Id. at 1016.




cians and hospitals gather information. Thus, direct market mailers
should only be able to obtain protected health care information with
the written consent of patients. Here, too, all the safeguards for the
documentation of informed consent should apply. This approach
would prevent health care information from being obtained by such
means as caller identification devices attached to the toll-free
numbers of pharmaceutical companies that supply product
information.2" If individuals wished their medical information to
appear on direct market lists, they would have to give their formal
written consent and thereby "opt-in" to this use of their data.
Second, under the protection of a federal health care privacy
statute, significant changes should occur in how worker data are used
within employee wellness programs and health care plans. Health
care data generated for counseling or treatment purposes should not
generally be released to nonmedical company personnel or used for
purposes that are not compatible with the reason for which the infor-
mation is collected. Although this approach to health care privacy
will result in changes at a number of corporations, at least one com-
pany, International Business Machines ("IBM"), already has adopted
an approach consistent with these practices.255 Moreover, IBM has
found that privacy protection is a fiscally sound policy. In recent
testimony at congressional hearings on medical privacy, a representa-
tive of IBM stated, 'The fact that we have been able to continue to
provide our employees a broad array of medical benefits at reasonable
costs while operating with these self-imposed restrictions is proof that
maintaining high standards of confidentiality need not compromise
efficiency. ' '256 Respect for privacy in the administration of health care
benefits need not be at the cost of fiscal health.
The response to the current abuses in health care privacy that
this Article advocates is within the reach of American law. Two bills
that were before the 103d Congress properly expressed the four essen-
tial elements of an American data protection law that this Article has
developed. The first bill, the Fair Health Information Practices Act of
1994,257 expressed the first three of the four principles necessary to an
effective American data protection law. It provided for transparency
254. Compare Ballinger, Direct Marketing News at I (cited in note 73).
255. See Linowes, Privacy in America at 30-31, 122 (cited in note 220).
256. Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994, Hearing on H.R. 4077, before the
Subcommittee on Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture of the House Committee
on Government Operations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (May 4, 1994) (Statement of Dr. Richard
Barker and Dr. Martin Sepulveda).
257. H.R. 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (cited in note 221). The bill was reintroduced in the
104th Congress. See note 221.
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of data processing systems by allowing patients to receive both a copy
of medical information about themselves and a notice of information
practices that describes their rights and the authorized uses and
disclosures of health information. The Fair Health Information
Practices Act also created a statutory fabric of defined obligations
with respect to possible uses and disclosures of personal information.
It established uniform rules that apply to all health care information
that is used or created during the medical treatment or payment
process. 258 Such information becomes protected health data subject to
statutory regulation. Finally, this bill assigned important procedural
and substantive rights to the individual.2 9 Among these rights is the
ability to seek correction of one's health information if it is not timely,
accurate, or complete.260 The Fair Health Information Practices Act
represents an excellent start in creating an American data protection
law for medical information.
Second, a bill which would create an effective, general data
protection board, was introduced in the last Senate.261 Similar bills
have been previously before the House of Representatives, 262 but
Congress also failed to promulgate this measure. Yet, health care
258. H.R. 4077, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. at §§ 101-130.
259. Id. at §§ 111-115; 161-164.
260. Id. at §§ 111-112.
261. Privacy Protection Act of 1993, S. 1735, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 1, 1993), in 139
Cong. Rec. S16494 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1993). This Bill offers a superior structure for data
protection oversight than the Bill considered in the House (Individual Privacy Protection Act of
1993, H.R. 135, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 8, 1993)).
In contrast, the Clinton Health Security Act set up two administrative entities with respon-
sibilities for oversight of the processing of health care information. Here, the problem is that
these bodies are structured in ways that make them unlikely to prove fit for the required tasks.
The first body with data protection responsibilities under the Clinton Health Security Act is
the National Health Board. Health Security Act § 5101(a) (cited in note 11). Yet, an agency
that seeks to limit health care spending and improve health care quality is not likely to be a
zealous advocate of the creation of limits on the sharing of medical data. This entity is not
likely to have spare institutional energy or political capital to devote to the protection of privacy.
Indeed, these central institutional concerns are ones that may appear to conflict with data
protection.
The Health Security Act also envisions the creation of a second body, a fifteen-member
National Privacy and Health Data Advisory Council, with data protection responsibilities. Id. at
§ 5140(a), (b). Unfortunately, this group is to meet only three times a year, id. at §5140(a), and
is likely, at best, to be a weak force in the decisionmaking process regarding the application of
personal health care information. The United States needs an independent data protection
board that is empowered to consider the effects and implications of data processing in the
medical and other sectors.
262. See, for example, Data Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 3669, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov.
18, 1989); Individual Privacy Protection Act of 1989, H.R. 126, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 7,
1989); Introductory Remarks of Senator Ervin on S.3418, reprinted in Legislative History of
Privacy Act, 3-8 (cited in note 242). A similar bill has been introduced in the 104th Congress.
See Individual Privacy Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 184, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 1995).
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reform should be accompanied by both passage of a fair information
practices act and by creation of such an agency. In its attempt to
protect an individual's interest in personal health care information,
data protection law will remain effective only if such an agency exists
to assist government, the legislature, the business community, and
citizens.
V. CONCLUSION
The processing of personal information already plays a critical
role in the provision, regulation, and financing of medical services by
government and private entities. Beyond the traditional doctor-
patient relationship and the provision of health services in hospitals,
a variety of public and private organizations now use personal
medical data. Health care reform will, however, further increase the
extent to which health care data are used and shared. As part of this
process, greater use will be made of information technology in an
attempt to control costs and increase the quality of care.
The heightened use of personal data in the provision of medical
services increases the threat to the patient's right of informational
self-determination. The risk is acute given American law's lack of
success in regulating the use of health care information. The legal
response to this situation should be a data protection law in which
informed consent to information processing plays a role. Yet, any
right of informed consent will only be effective when anchored within
an overall legal set of rules for the processing of health care informa-
tion.
This Article has argued that such rules should be established
in an American data protection law. It has developed the four essent-
ial elements of this law: First, the law must create a statutory fabric
that defines obligations for those who process health care information.
Second, the law must require transparency, meaning that the indi-
vidual must receive notice of the structure of the processing of her
personal data. Third, the law must assign limited procedural and
substantive rights to the data subject. Citizens must know whether
they are required to supply medical information and must know the
mechanisms by which they can inspect and correct data. These pro-
cedural and substantive rights must also include the right to informed
consent to uses of medical data and the right to receive suitable
remedies for abuses of medical privacy. Fourth and finally, the
American data protection law must ensure governmental oversight of
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information processing. In an era of rapid technological change, a
data protection board is necessary to carry out ongoing monitoring of
technological developments and to advise the legislature of the extent
of compliance with fair information practices. Such an agency is also
needed to help citizens exercise their rights and to assist the business
community in its response to national and international regulations.
According to Knock, the protagonist in a French farce, 'People
in good health are sick ones who don't know it."263 All of us will need
medical care at one time or another; indeed, a critical test of the fun-
damental fairness of a society is the manner in which it provides its
citizens with such services. 26 Medical treatment inevitably leads,
however, to the creation of a tremendous amount of health care infor-
mation. When this information circulates without adequate protec-
tion, a strong negative pressure on the individual may arise and
threaten the individual's ability to engage in critical reflection and
join in communal life. Even mere uncertainty about social use of
personal medical information can make individuals reluctant to seek
preventative care. An essential part of any American health care
reform must be a data protection law that improves how health care
information is used, shared, and stored. Data protection law must be
part of the prescription for the future health of the democratic order
in the United States.
263. Jules Romains, Knock ou Le triomphe de la Mddecine, Act I at 35 (Gallimard, 2d ed.
1985) (orig. ed. 1924) ("Les gens bien portants sont des malades qui s'ignoren').
264. Dworkin, 41 N. Y. Rev. of Books at 23 (cited in note 11) (discussing issues of justice in
health care).
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